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ABSTRACT
CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF ENTERPRISE RISKS:
A DELPHI FEASIBILITY STUDY
by
Robert Baksa
A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for ongoing
assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately mitigated. Enterprises
are perpetually exposed to fraud, poor decision making and/or other inefficiencies that
can lead to significant financial loss and/or increased levels of operating risk.
Increasingly, Information Systems are being harnessed to reinvent the risk management
process. One promising technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to transform the
audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous review of all
transactions. However, the highly integrated, rapidly changing and hypercompetitive
business environment of many corporations spawns numerous Enterprise Risks that have
been excluded from standard risk management processes. An extension of Continuous
Auditing is Continuous Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review
business processes for unexpected deviations.

Using a Delphi, the feasibility and

desirability of applying Continuous Monitoring to different Enterprise Risks is studied.
This study uncovers a significant relationship between the perceived business value of
Continuous Monitoring and years of experience in Risk Management and Auditing,
determines that all key architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring system are
known, and indicates that Continuous Monitoring may be better suited for monitoring
computer crime than monitoring strategic risks such as the loss of a competitive position.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction
A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for timely and
ongoing assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately identified and
mitigated. These needs are paramount especially in large multinational corporations with
highly distributed operations, extremely complex operating environments, and massive
volumes of data, transactions, risks and controls that require review. Organizations are
continually exposed to significant errors, fraud and/or inefficiencies that can lead to
significant financial loss and increased levels of operating risk. The larger and more
complex the organization, the greater these Enterprise Risks are (Coderre 2005).
An unmitigated Enterprise Risk can quickly grow into a full blown and farreaching financial crisis, which is a long-standing and pervasive problem for capital
markets and society as a whole. Reinhart and Rogoff chronicled financial crises over
eight millennia that occurred in 66 distinct countries (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011).
Moreover, business complexity has increased six-fold in sixty years; and, organizational
complexity in terms of structures, processes and systems has increased by a factor of
thirty-five (Morieux and Tollman 2014). During the same period, some have suggested
that risk management has not evolved as quickly.

The limited complexity and

information richness currently used by internal auditors is woefully inadequate to model
complex, information rich, global and highly dynamic markets (Redman and Hay 2012).
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Unfortunately, these antiquated risk management procedures afford only a limited
evaluation of an organization’s business processes and Enterprise Risks. In today's
hyper-complex and highly integrated operating environments, these risk management
techniques are becoming increasingly inadequate as a preventative measure for a
financial crisis.
Increasingly, technology is being harnessed to reinvent and improve risk
management processes. Recent advances in Information Systems, artificial intelligence
and modeling techniques have enabled sophisticated risk analysis.

One particularly

promising application of this technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to
transform the audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous
review of all transactions. However, today’s highly integrated, rapidly changing and
hypercompetitive business environment spawns numerous Enterprise Risks that
historically have been excluded from typical internal risk management processes (e.g.,
surprise competitive threats, theft of sensitive customer data and supply chain failures).
These high-value risks pose a material threat to today’s corporations, which perhaps
exceed the danger posed by fine-grain transactional risks that Continuous Auditing is
predominately being used for at this time.
An extension of Continuous Auditing is referred to in this study as Continuous
Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review business processes for
unexpected deviations. Continuous Monitoring, like Continuous Auditing, requires a
comprehensive understanding of an organization’s business processes as well as their
potential failure modes, key control points, rules, metrics and exceptions. When the
process of identifying potential risks is automated, organizations are able to perform risk
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assessments in real time, analyze business processes for anomalies and utilize data-driven
indicators to identify emerging risks, which should help management make informed
decisions, mitigate material risks and, hopefully, help prevent the next financial crisis.
This research study will seek to understand which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to
Continuous Monitoring techniques.

1.2 Research Problem
Whether or not Continuous Monitoring can be effectively used by management to
monitor Enterprise Risks remains an open research question. Some believe that there are
sizable benefits to extending the use of Continuous Monitoring applications.

For

example, one of the Office of Financial Research’s key 2014 research objectives is to
identify, assess and monitor potential threats to the United States’ financial stability by
developing tools that will monitor quantitative metrics and qualitative surveillance
(Berner 2013). However, there are numerous obstacles: 1) replacing human judgment
tends to be difficult, costly and computationally intensive; 2) large-scale Continuous
Monitoring systems could be resisted because of their inscrutable complexity and
novelty; 3) people and organizations may fear Continuous Monitoring because it erodes
their competitive advantage and powerbase.
To determine whether this is a viable approach, I will explore the research
question: What are the most potentially fruitful Enterprise Risks and a plausible technical
architecture to support these implementations?
By using a Delphi, I will seek to drive expert consensus on the desirability and
feasibility for applying Continuous Monitoring techniques to Enterprise Risks. The
ultimate goal of this research is to provide a solid foundation for Continuous Monitoring
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implementations that drastically improves an organization’s risk management processes
by pulling from the Continuous Auditing, Enterprise Risk Management, and Information
Systems literature.

Figure 1.1

Blends three distinct disciplines.

1.3 Significance of this Research
Currently, the conditions that could lead to another major corporate catastrophe may not
be fully known or understood at the appropriate level within a corporation, until it is too
late to take meaningful action. This is due to the complex and integrated dependencies
between corporations and the sheer number of potential Enterprise Risks they face.
Continuous Monitoring’s key objectives are to quickly detect a risk, assess its potential
magnitude, and route it to the appropriate party for remediation, thereby reducing the
probability of a corporate catastrophe.
Continuous Monitoring has the potential to improve an organization’s Enterprise
Risk Management processes, thereby reducing the probability of crisis resulting from an
organization’s unmitigated risks. However, Continuous Monitoring can only be effective
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in this regard; if it is widely adopted and trusted by management throughout the
enterprise.
With the ultimate goal of preventing the next crisis, this research study seeks to
identify the Enterprise Risks that are most amenable to Continuous Monitoring, provide
an architectural framework for future Continuous Monitoring implementations, and, most
likely, identify future research opportunities within the domain of Continuous
Monitoring. To that end, the following four research questions were studied:
•

•

•

•

RQ1: What individual and organizational characteristics are related to the
likelihood of favorable opinions toward the adoption of Continuous
Monitoring?
RQ2: Which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to Continuous
Monitoring?
RQ3: Which Continuous Monitoring architectural components are
perceived as most applicable to which types of Enterprise Risks?
RQ4: How does participation in an online Delphi process change the
initial viewpoints of the participants?

The research methodology was a three-round Collaborative Design Delphi
targeting professionals with experience in risk management, accounting and/or
Information Systems. The Round 1 questionnaire had a consent form, demographic
questions and scenario generation questions.

Round 2 presented the three most

auspicious risk scenarios from Round 1 and had participants evaluate the desirability and
feasibility of using Continuous Monitoring on these risk scenarios. Round 3 presented
the key assumptions collected in Round 2 and let the participants re-evaluate their
desirability and feasibility answers from Round 2.
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1.4 Organizational Structure
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief literature
review for Enterprise Risk Management. Chapter 3 is a literature review for Continuous
Auditing and Monitoring.

Chapter 4 surveys the enabling Information System

technologies for Continuous Auditing and Monitoring systems. Chapter 5 lays out a
research agenda and methods. Chapter 6 presents the results of this Research Study.
Chapter 7 summarizes this research study’s findings and lists some research questions
that could be addressed in future studies.
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CHAPTER 2
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT

2.1 Definition
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a top-down risk-based approach to strategically
manage a broad spectrum of corporate risks at the enterprise level. ERM is conceptually
similar to corporate risk management, business risk management, holistic risk
management, integrated risk management and strategic risk management, although each
of these terms has a slightly different nuance (D'Arcy 2001).
Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) defines ERM as “a discipline by which an
organization in any industry assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks
from all sources for the purposes of increasing the organization’s short- and long-term
value to its stakeholders.” This definition highlights ERM’s value creation as well as risk
mitigation aspects.

The corporation defines a top down process that methodically

evaluates all plausible risks and considers their effect on all the relative stakeholders
(CAS 2003, p. 8).
The Committee of Sponsoring Organization (COSO) of the Treadway
Commission’s ERM definition is “a process, affected by an entity’s board of directors,
management and other personnel, applied in strategy-setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
entity objectives.”

This definition highlights ongoing and strategic process flowing

throughout the entire corporation and affecting people at every level. This process is
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designed to identify events that, if they occur, could materially affect the organization,
achieve one or more separate but overlapping objectives, and provide reasonable
assurance to the corporation’s management (COSO 2004, p. 2).
(Makomaski 2008) simply and succinctly defines Enterprise Risk Management as
a decision-making discipline that addresses variation in company goals. Alviniussen and
Jankensgård define ERM as a holistic and company-wide approach (i.e., not a siloapproach) to managing risks and centralizing information in a Risk Universe
(Alviniussen and Jankensgård 2009). They draw insights from modern portfolio theory
that suggests that risks should be measured and managed on a portfolio basis and
balanced against potential rewards, as well as from financial theorists that point out
financial distress generally entails costly consequences. Consequently, an effective risk
management program derives tangible business value by avoiding the costs associated
with financial distress.

2.2 History
In 1654, the precursors to modern risk management were established when Pascal and
Fermat discovered the basics of probability. By 1725, mathematicians were devising
tables of life expectancy and marine insurance emerged as a legitimate business in
England.

In 1730, Abraham de Moivre discovered two essential ingredients for

quantifying risk: standard deviation and normal distribution. In 1875, Francis Glaton
discovered regression to the mean.

In 1952, Harry Markowitz pioneered

modern

portfolio theory (Bernstein 1996).
In the 1950s, the risk management field was formalized by a group of insurance
professors. The first risk management book was Risk Management in the Business
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Enterprise.

The basic premise was to maximize the productive efficiency of the

corporation by managing risks in a comprehensive manner, and not simply insure them
(Mehr and Hedge 1963).
In the 1970s, financial risk (e.g., foreign exchange risk, commodity price risk and
equity risk) became an important source of organizational risk. Therefore, tools were
developed for handling them (e.g., foreign currency futures, commodity futures contracts,
and equity options). These tools usage accelerated during the next two decades and their
misuse led to some exorbitant losses: Orange County ($1.5 Billion), Barings Bank ($500
Million), and Procter & Gamble ($157 Million) (Razali and Tahir 2011). In the 1990s,
operational risk management emerged when shareholders began pressuring corporations
to proactively mitigate risks rather than simply buying insurance for them. In the wake of
various major corporate scandals and bankruptcies resulting from poor risk management,
the United States government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation in 2002, which
mandates a top down risk assessment. Shortly thereafter, ERM was defined by CAS
(Dionne 2013).

2.3 Process
At a high-level, there are two main potential Enterprise Risk Management processes
described in the literature: CAS and COCO. CAS defines the high-level ERM process as
follows: establish context, identify risks, analyze/quantify risks, assess/prioritize risks,
treat/exploit risks, and monitor and review the process (CAS 2003). There are eight
components of the COSO Integrated Framework:
1. Internal environment which refers to risk management philosophy, risk
appetite, integrating of ethical values and the working environment of an
enterprise
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2. Objective setting which should be aligned with corporate vision and risk
appetite
3. Event identification
4. Risk assessment that measures the frequency and impact of potential
losses
5. Risk response is how a corporation mitigates risks. It may include
avoidance, acceptance, and transfer of risk to and external entity
6. Control activities ensure the effectiveness of the risk management
implementation
7. Information and communication disseminates program information
throughout the corporations
8. Monitoring ensures that all risk management measures are appropriate and
effective in mitigating risks (COSO 2004).

2.4 Benefits of Enterprise Risk Management
ERM should promote top-down risk awareness, which facilitates better operational and
strategic decision-making. Some believe that ERM will become the new minimum
standard for risk management, the key to survival for many companies and a significant
source of competitive advantage (Stroh 2005).

The following summarizes the key

benefits described in the literature.
•

•

•

(Berinato 2004) asserts that corporations that adopt ERM have fewer
failed business ventures and incur less costs due to adverse events. (Heng
Yik, Jifeng et al. 2011) showed that insurers with the best ERM programs
had lower stock volatility and higher profitability as compared to those of
their non-ERM or weak ERM peers.
(COSO 2004) states that the benefits of its framework are improved
capital deployment, tighten alignment between strategy and risk, increased
opportunity to seize opportunities and reduced operational surprises.
(Cumming and Hirtle 2001) state that ERM enables corporations to
allocate capital efficiently among their business units and improves
financial disclosures by providing a consistent and comprehensive
assessment of the corporation’s risk exposure.
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•

•

•

•

•

(Hoyt and Liebenbergerg 2008) found a positive relationship between
United States Insurers’ market value and the use of ERM. The ERM
premium was roughly 20%, which is both statistically and economically
significant.
(KPMG 2011) states that corporations that have ERM processes tend to
better understand their business risk profile and are often more proactive
in heading off threats, and, rapidly surfacing and evaluating opportunities.
(Lindberg and Seifert 2011) explains how ERM can aid with Dodd-Frank
compliance.
(Nocco 2006) speculates that ERM creates shareholder values by
improving the mechanism to quantify and manage a corporation’s riskreturn tradeoff
(Meulbroek 2002) determines that ERM increases corporate valuations,
decreases financial distress costs, and reduces external monitoring and
capital costs.

2.5 Adoption
There are many reasons a corporation may adopt ERM. Paape and Speklé found a
corporation’s regulatory environment, internal factors, ownership structure, and, firm and
industry-related characteristics influence the choice to adopt ERM (Paape and Speklé
2012). For non-financial corporations (Alviniussen and Jankensgård 2009) determine the
main motivations for implementing ERM (listed in order from the most cited to least) are
improving corporate governance, improving compliance, mandate by board of directors,
increasing shareholder value, improving decision marking, and following good business
practices. Once a corporation decides to implement ERM they should adopt a Risk
Taxonomy, ERM Framework and Best Practices, which are described in the following
subsections.
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2.5.1

Risk Taxonomy

There are numerous types of risks that can be incorporated into an ERM. However, the
list below describes the risk taxonomy that is most frequently associated with ERM
literature:
•

•

•

•

2.5.2

Compliance Risk: Risk of violations or non-conformance with laws, rules,
regulations, prescribed practices or ethical standards (OCC 1998).
Financial Risk: Risk of loss due to economic conditions. For example,
Credit Risk is the risk of an obligor's failure to meet the terms of a
contract; Foreign Exchange Risk is the risk arising from movement in
foreign exchange rates; Liquidity Risk is the inability to meet obligations
when they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses; Price Risk is
the adverse changes in the value of portfolios of financial instruments
(OCC 1998).
Strategic Risk: “Risk to earnings or capital arising from adverse business
decisions or improper implementation of them. This risk is a function of
the compatibility between an organization’s strategic goals, the business
strategies developed to achieve those goals, the resources deployed against
them, and the quality of the implementation of those decisions” (OCC
1998, p. 5).
Operational Risk: Risk of inadequate or failed internal or external
processes, people and systems (Basel 2001)

ERM Frameworks

There are a number of ERM frameworks that are currently being used.

The most

frequently cited are:
•

A Risk Management Standard by the Federation of European Risk
Management (FERMA).

•

Australia/New Zealand Standard 4360-Risk Management.

•

Basel.

•

COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework.

•

King ll Report by The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA).

•

Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (i.e.,
Turnbull Report).

12

•

The Institute of Management Accountants’ (IMA) “A Global Perspective
on Assessing Internal Control over Financing Reporting” (ICoFR).

Although these standards may differ in name, industry and region, they all identify,
prioritize and quantify risks in order to help corporations effectively manage their
exposure (Yazid, Hussin et al. 2011)
2.5.3

Best Practices

The literature describes several best practices that have been adopted by successful ERM
implementations. (Lawrence 2005) describe ten best practices for an ERM
implementation:
1. Engage senior management and board.
2. Create an independent ERM entity under the Chief Risk Officer.
3. Impose a top-down governance structure.
4. Select an ERM framework suitable for the corporation’s key risk.
5. Establish a risk aware culture.
6. Disseminate written policies with risk limits and business boundaries.
7. Create an ERM dashboard that integrates key quantitative and qualitative
risk metrics.
8. Use risk analytics to measure risk concentrations and interdependencies.
9. Integrate ERM into strategic planning, business processes and
performance measurement.
10. Optimize for risk-adjusted profitability.
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(Barton, Shenkir et al. 2009) suggest the following seven best practices:
1. Integrate the ERM process into the corporation’s strategy.
2. Understand the corporation’s risk appetite.
3. Understand the corporation’s major risks.
4. Ensure corporate governance is strong.
5. Develop meaningful risk metrics.
6. Link compensation to risk.
7. Do not dismiss high impact low probability risks.

2.6 Challenges
ERM has not been universally adopted. Beasley and Clune survived senior accounting
executives, which revealed only 20% currently had an ERM in their corporation and 29%
had no plans to implement one (Beasley, Clune et al. 2005). Negus highlights ten
common ERM implementation challenges: Assessing ERM’s value, balancing risk
visibility with legal exposure, defining risk, selecting a risk assessment method,
assessment metrics and time horizon, understanding a risk’s multiple event likelihoods
and severities, ERM ownership (i.e., determining what internal group champions the
ERM effort), risk reporting (i.e., determining what information should be shared with
whom), simulations and stress tests (i.e., balancing the needs for meaningful simulation
with the near infinite number of potential scenarios) (Negus 2010).
In September 2008, (Beasley, Branson et al. 2009) surveyed more than 700
corporations, whose revenue ranged from $15 thousand to $115 Billion. The main
barriers to ERM implementation were competing priorities, insufficient resources, lack of
perceived value, lack of executive leadership, incremental bureaucracy, and legal or
regulatory barriers.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTINUOUS AUDITING AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING

3.1 Definitions
Global Technology Audit Guide (GTAG) defines Continuous Auditing as a process to
ensure that the policies, procedures, and business processes are operating effectively,
which includes defining the control objectives and assurance assertions and establishing
automated tests to highlight activities and transactions that fail to comply. They also
define several related processes:
•

•

•

Continuous Control Assessment: a process that focuses on the early
detection of control deficiencies.
Continuous Risk Assessment: a process that detects processes or systems
that experience higher than expected levels of risk (Coderre 2005).
Continuous Monitoring: a process to ensure that the policies, procedures,
and business processes are operating effectively, which includes defining
the control objectives and assurance assertions and establishing automated
tests to highlight activities and transactions that fail to comply.

Deloitte’s definition of Continuous Auditing and Continuous Monitoring adds the nuance
that Continuous Auditing is used by internal audit to continually gather data that supports
their auditing activities while Continuous Monitoring is used by management to
continually review business processes for unexpected deviations (2010). Continuous
Monitoring, per the above Deloitte definition, is related to Continuous Auditing.
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) and the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) define Continuous Auditing as “a
methodology that enables independent auditors to provide written assurance on the
subject matter using a series of auditor’s reports issued simultaneously, or within a short
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time after the occurrence of the events that underline the subject matter” (CICA/AICPA
1999, p. xiii) Rezaee defines Continuous Auditing as “a systematic process of gathering
electronic evidence as a reasonable basis to render an opinion on fair presentation of
financial statements prepared under the paperless, real-time accounting system” (Rezaee
2001, p. 151). Helms and Mancino define Continuous Auditing as “software to detect
auditors specific exceptions from all transactions that are processed either in real-time or
near real-time environments. These exceptions could be investigated immediately or
written to an auditor’s log for subsequent work” (Helms, Mancino et al. 1999, p. 62).
Although the above definitions differ in semantics and scope, they all share the notion of
performing auditing processes quickly and continuously.

3.2 History
Accounting practices have been around for a very long time. In the Mesopotamia, circa
3500 BC, scribes, the forerunners of modern day accountants, would record the terms of
financial transactions on tamper-resistant clay tablets (Alexander 2002). In the United
States, contemporary accounting practices emerged in the 19th century when accounting
professionals applied quantitative methods to assess the amount, timing and certainty of a
corporation's future cash flows (King 2006). Over time, these accounting practices have
amassed a comparatively cheap and plentiful workforce, ingrained themselves into
contemporary business processes, and proven generally reliable, flexible and independent
from underlying information technology (Weber). Perhaps motivated by their own selfinterest, several influential accounting professionals are highly skeptical that these
practices need to be drastically changed (Whitehouse 2010).
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Cash is generally credited with the seminal article that laid the foundation for the
Continuous Auditing domain space. Cash and Bailey describe various procedures to
validate the correctness of Electronic Data Processing (EDP) systems and The Internal
Control Model (TICOM) (Cash Jr, Bailey Jr et al. 1977). This model enables the
automation of testing an organization’s internal control system. He envisioned that the
organization’s internal control would be stored in a database. Vasarhelyi and Halper
coined the term Continuous Auditing when they described the process used at AT&T
Bell Labs to audit a large paperless billing system in real-time (Vasarhelyi and Halper
1991). This paper describes the key building blocks of a Continuous Auditing system:
extracting audit data from a system, using it to calculate operational analytics that are
compared to standard metrics, generating alarms that alert an auditor to potential issues
and generating audit reports.

3.3 Process
The Continuous Auditing literature describes many different processes.

Chan and

Vasarhelyi defines a basic Continuous Auditing process, which is a four-stage process.
Stage 1 automates data capture. Stage 2 uses data modeling of historic transactions and
account balances to create benchmarks. Stage 3 uses these benchmarks to evaluate
internal controls, transactions and account balances.

Stage 4 investigates only the

benchmark exceptions. If no exceptions are discovered, the financial information is
deemed to be free of material errors, omissions and fraud (Chan and Vasarhelyi 2011).
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Data Capture

Figure 3.1
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Basic continuous auditing process.

(Coderre 2006) puts forward a five-step process to continuously analyze audit data:
1. Define Objectives, which includes identifying key Information Systems
and data sources, and understanding the business processes and
application systems in place.
2. Determine Data Access and Use, which includes selecting analysis tools,
developing analysis capabilities, auditor analysis skills and techniques,
and assessing integrity and reliability of the data.
3. Perform a Continuous Control Assessment, which includes identifying
critical control points, defining control rules, defining exceptions, and
designing an approach to test controls and identify deficiencies.
4. Perform a Continuous Risk Assessment, which includes defining entities
to be evaluated, identifying risk categories and identifying data-driven
indicators.
5. Report and Manage Results, which includes prioritizing results,
identifying control deficiencies or increased levels of risk, initiating
appropriate audit response, providing results to management, evaluating
the results of the actions taken, and monitoring and evaluating the
effectiveness and security over the whole process.
(Fedorowicz 2008) has a five-step process:
1. Identify the full range of risks.
2. Establish a risk management culture.
3. Align controls with risks embedded in the business processes.
4. Devise procedures for manual interventions.
5. Consolidate and track controls used in the auditing process.
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(Rezaee 2002) suggests a ten-step process:
1. Define audit objectives.
2. Understand business rules.
3. Identify key business data.
4. Obtain data.
5. Identify data elements.
6. Establish data access.
7. Extract data.
8. Create Audit Meta-data.
9. Load Audit Data.
10. Execute Audit Test Scripts.

3.4 Benefits
Several different studies and research reports have listed a wide array of potential
benefits from a well-functioning Continuous Auditing system. A Deloitte report (2010)
lists the following benefits that could result from a Continuous Auditing system:
improved risk and control assurance, reduced audit costs, increased audit effectiveness,
reduced audit cycles, identifying control exceptions in real time by replacing manual
preventative controls with automated detective controls, and increased competitive
advantage and shareholder value. A Gartner research report written by (Caldwell and
Proctor 2010) states that the primary market drivers for Continuous Auditing are
regulatory compliance, risk management and business performance. In September 2008,
the Economist asked 446 senior executives what their views were on the expected
benefits from standardizing/automating their financial processes. The list of expected
benefits include (listed from most frequently cited to least frequently cited): cutting back
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on error prone manual processes, enhancing data integrity, allowing employees to focus
on high value activities, reducing costs, institutionalizing standard processes across the
enterprise, improving productivity, increasing process visibility, and enhancing
compliance with regulatory requirements (Fedorowicz 2008). In one specific example
(Brennan 2008), who has implemented Continuous Auditing techniques at Siemens, lists
the following benefits that his organization has received from Continuous Auditing:
audits get deeper and broader, audits take less time, improve communication with
external auditors and key controls are rationalized. The following subsections explore
some of the potential benefits of a Continuous Auditing in more detail.
3.4.1

Reduced Costs

Several cost savings are associated with Continuous Auditing, which automates the
auditing of business processes. First, Continuous Auditing continually and automatically
monitors control effectiveness, which eliminates the labor-intensive and repetitive retesting of controls by obviating the need to re-perform most if not all point-in-time audits.
Second, placing the requisite audit data in a central repository that can be remotely
accessed obviates the need for traveling to remote locations to perform site audits. Third,
external auditor’s fees would be ideally eliminated or, at least, sharply reduced because
the Continuous Auditing systems would automatically perform most, if not all, of the
auditing and assurance processes.
A study by (Wallace 1984) concluded that shifting audit responsibility to internal
auditors and away from external auditors reduces the total auditing cost for an
organization. Reducing the cost of the audit and monitoring processes is especially
germane because budgetary constraints on these functions have perpetually become more
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stringent.

These cost savings can be quantified and compared to the cost of

implementing a Continuous Auditing system. However, other advantages of automation
such as enhanced data integrity, fewer instances of noncompliance, better business
decisions and risk management and reduced fraud risk are harder to quantify.
3.4.2

Improved Audit Quality

There are several ways that Continuous Auditing could improve audit quality. Means
and Warren point out the limitations of the traditional auditing model, which relies on the
presence of internal controls and sampling (i.e., the periodic checks of selected controls)
(Means and Warren 2005). Much of the traditional audit process must be done manually
in order to examine the effectiveness of a corporation’s internal controls. However,
Continuous Auditing advances make plausible a new and better audit approach that
continuously checks all of an organization’s financials and related transactional data, and
perpetually searches for audit anomalies or outright fraud.

Generally speaking,

Continuous Auditing systems detect audit exceptions quickly and notify the appropriate
parties so corrective action can also be taken quickly.
Several studies illuminate the foibles of human decision making that detract from
audit quality.

Since Continuous Auditing systems do not share these biases, these

systems could presumably perform better and more objective audits. Bazerman and
Loewenstein suggest that auditors cannot be totally objective because of an innate selfserving bias (Bazerman, Loewenstein et al. 2002).

They tend to discount facts

contradicting their preferred position and uncritically embrace evidence supporting it. He
lists several reasons for this: ambiguity (auditors tend to reach for self-serving
conclusions whenever ambiguity surrounds evidence), attachment (auditors are highly
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motivated to remain in a client's good graces), and approval (auditor may accept a more
aggressive accounting position from clients than they themselves would recommend).
Just like all human beings, auditors suffer from the foibles of human decisionmaking. Hammond and Keene states eight psychological traps that may lead to bad
decision-making:
1. The status quo trap: biases towards maintaining the current situation even
when better alternatives exist.
2. The sunk cost trap: the tendency to justify past decisions.
3. The evidence trap: the tendency to search for information supporting an
existing predilection and to discount opposing information.
4. The framing trap: undermining the entire decision-making process by
misstating the problem.
5. The overconfidence trap: overestimating the accuracy of our forecasts.
6. The prudence trap: tendency to be overcautious when estimating uncertain
events.
7. The recallability trap: the tendency to give undue weight to recent and
dramatic events.
8. The anchoring trap: the tendency to give disproportionate weight to the
first information received (Hammond, Keeney et al. 2001).

(Smith and Kida 1991) confirms that auditors do fall prey to the anchoring trap however,
expert auditors performing familiar job-related tasks are less likely to fall into the
anchoring trap than the control groups were.
As an organization’s scale and scope of operations increases so does the
complexity of its business transactions, risk exposure, and, scale and scope of their audit
procedures. Since manual audit procedures do not scale well, once an organization
reaches a sufficient size these audit procedures become prohibitively expensive and timeconsuming to execute. On the contrary, Continuous Auditing tends to be highly scalable.
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Consequently, it may be the only viable alternative for today's largest global
organizations.
3.4.3

Compliance with Laws and Regulations

Public Organizations are forced to comply with many different laws and regulations
however, the cost to comply with these laws and regulations is staggering. For example,
United States-based companies must comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of
2002, which was enacted in the wake of a number of major accounting scandals including
the collapse of Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom. A study conducted by Finance
Executives International (FEI) indicated that for 185 companies with average revenues of
$4.7 billion, the average compliance costs were $1.7 million (FEI 2008). Section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires management and the external auditor to
report on the adequacy of a company's internal controls, is the most costly aspect of the
legislation for companies to implement because documenting and testing important
financial controls requires enormous effort (Mehra 2006). Moreover, most organizations
have additional compliance costs such as producing audited financial statements, which
requires an independent auditor to attest to the accuracy and completeness of their
financial statements.
There is a clear trend toward increasing and constantly evolving regulatory
requirements. For example, in the banking industry the Basel I accord, which was ratified
in 1988, influenced banks residing in G-10 countries behavior by proscribing capital
ratios (Jablecki 2009), which was replaced by Basel II in June 2004, and Basel III
(Moody's 2012). In July of 2010 when the Dodd-Frank legislation was signed into law,
the banking industry received a whole new wave of regulations. This act was billed as
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the most sweeping overhaul of the United States financial regulatory system since the
Great Depression (2009) and was responsible for roughly 300 new regulatory
requirements affecting many different lines of business for financial institutions (Protess
2011). For example, it limits abusive lending practices, fees for debit-card usage and
high-risk bets on complex derivative securities, creates a bureau to protect consumers
from financial fraud, and provides a means for the government to supervise the largest
financial institutions under the guise of avoiding catastrophic financial failure (2011).
Clearly, these new compliance requirements will increase these organizations’
compliance expense. For example, Basel II, which is an international standard that
regulates how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against financial and
operational risks, has three Pillars. Pillar 1 quantifies the bank's credit risk (i.e., the risk
of a loss due to a debtor's nonpayment of a loan or other line of credit) and operational
risk (the risk of loss from a bank’s business functions including fraud risk and
environmental risks) to calculate the capital requirements for international banks. These
capital requirements aim to ensure that international banks have sufficient capital to meet
their requirements, cover unexpected losses and promote public confidence. In general,
the greater the bank’s risk, the greater its capital reserves must be. Pillar 2 describes the
requisite management obligations in evaluating the bank’s corporate governance, risk
management and risk profiles that are not explicitly covered by Pillar 1. Systemic risk
(i.e., the risk of loss due to a collapse of the entire financial system or market),
concentration risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to the concentration of a bank’s outstanding
accounts relative to the total number of debtors that the bank has lent money to) and
liquidity risk (i.e., the risk of loss resulting from being unable to trade a security or asset
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quickly) are some of the residual risks that are addressed in Pillar 2. Pillar 3 explains
transparency and disclosure requirements.

Specifically, stakeholders should have

sufficient understanding of the bank's activities and risks to make informed decisions
about the bank's overall risk position (2006). The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency estimates that if all nationally chartered banks were to adopt Basel II, the
combined compliance costs would be nearly $1.1 billion, or almost $680,000 per bank
(VanHoose 2007).
There have been several journal articles that suggest Continuous Auditing could
help organizations reduce their cost of compliance. Means and Warren discusses how
new software that continuously extracts data from enterprise systems can perform a broad
range of auditing, fraud tests and anomaly identification (Means and Warren 2005).
Vasarhelyi asserts that Continuous Auditing techniques may assist in Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance by providing evidence that controls are functioning and furthermore provide
an understanding of the consequences of ineffective or non-operational controls
(Vasarhelyi 2004). While this software may never totally replace manual auditing, many
speculate that it could cost-effectively perform many traditional auditing tasks.
3.4.4

Reduced Risk

Companies that quickly make high-quality decisions and implement them effectively
generally beat out rivals (Blenko and Mankins 2012). Conversely, according to a Booz
Allen report, the biggest threat to shareholder value over the past ten years was overly
risky decisions made by senior management. They cost more shareholder value than
other audit issues such as fraud, ethics violations or rogue traders (Ovans 2012). This
claim is supported by a (ORX 2012) report that states its consortium of financial service
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firm’s biggest loss category was “Execution, Delivery and Process Management”, which
accounted for 32% of their total loss or €4.8 billion in 2011.

Although the supporting

research is sparse, Continuous Auditing seeks to drastically improve the organizational
decision and risk management processes by augmenting and checking human decisionmaking. Therefore, it’s plausible that Continuous Auditing could improve organizational
decision-making and reduce the number of associated loss events, thereby directly
improving the organization’s bottom line.
In 2008, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimated that United
States organizations lost 7% of their annual revenues, approximately $994 billion, to
fraudulent activity.

Even more troubling, internal and external audits and internal

controls detect only 23.3% of all fraud. Fraudulent financial statements had the highest
median loss of all fraud schemes with a median loss of $2 million per incident (Ratley
2008).
Opinions vary on how effective Continuous Auditing would be in detecting
fraudulent financial statements, which is generally perpetrated by executives of an
organization. Vasarhelyi, and Kogan asserts that a well performed Continuous Audit
would have detected Enron's fraudulent accounting improprieties, because the continuous
assurance process would have triggered alarms that would have been difficult for Enron's
operational managers, auditors and top management to ignore (Vasarhelyi, Kogan et al.
2002). However, Krass argues that Continuous Auditing probably would not prevent
fraud that is perpetrated at the highest levels of an organization, which was the case with
Enron (Krass 2002).
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There is a growing body of research that suggests Continuous Auditing could be a
valuable tool in preventing some types of fraud schemes. Lin used a fuzzy neural
network to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting for an organization (Lin 2003).
Using publicly available metrics such as allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage
of net sales and accounts receivable, ratio of gross margin to net sales, net sales, accounts
receivable and allowance for doubtful accounts, this model was able to successfully
detect fraud 35% of the time, which was better than the logistic regression model that
only had a 5% detection rate. Baker and McCollum explain how machine learning
technologies such as inductive logic programming and neural nets are helping
organizations such as Bank Itau and Sun Trust Bank detect suspicious activity and
mitigate the risk of fraudulent transactions (Baker and McCollum 2005). Viaene and
Derrig investigate the explicative capabilities of three classification algorithms (neural
nets, decision trees and logistical regression) in detecting fraudulent automobile claims
that occurred in Massachusetts during 1993 (Viaene, Derrig et al. 2002).
(Eining 1997) compared three decision aids (checklist, logistic regression and
expert systems) on their ability to help auditors detect fraudulent reporting.

He

concluded that auditors that used expert systems made better decisions that were more
consistent with their assessment of risk than did auditors that used either checklists or
logistic regression, or no decision aids. Kuhn and Sutton describe how Continuous
Auditing techniques could have been used to detect WorldCom's business transactions
that did not conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and
consequently overstated WorldCom's revenues (Kuhn and Sutton 2006).
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There are many other types of risks that plague corporations. For example, one
recent Delphi study, using 37 professionals, identified 86 separate threats in 11 different
categories that potentially are important for the next decade (Turoff 2012). Most of these
threats would materially and adversely affect the corporation’s ability to operate
normally.
3.4.5

More Frequent Audited Disclosures

Electronic commerce, electronic data interchange and the Internet are dramatically
changing an organization’s business practices for record keeping.

As more of an

organization's record keeping becomes digitized, the processes of collecting audit
information, assuring its accuracy and disseminating financial reports to stakeholders can
be highly automated. The automation of the financial reporting process could enable
financial reports to be released more frequently. Currently, most companies release
unaudited financial reports quarterly and audited financial reports annually. However,
increasingly stakeholders require more timely communication of financial information,
which requires auditors to invent new ways to continuously monitor, gather and analyze
audit evidence (Rezaee 2002).
An experiment conducted by (Hunton 2002) demonstrated the potential value of
more frequent financial reporting. He concludes that monthly financial reporting even
without assurance (i.e., unaudited), would significantly enhance the usefulness of
financial statements, improve the quality of earnings, reduce managements’
aggressiveness with respect to accounting accruals and estimates, reduce stock price
volatility, improve analyst consensus of future earnings estimates and reduce the
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organizations cost of capital.

These effects were more pronounced if the monthly

financial statements were accompanied by assurance (i.e., audited).
(Botosan 1997) examine the association between disclosure levels and the cost of
equity by regressing estimates on an organization’s cost of equity on market betas (i.e.,
its non-diversifiable risk) and firm size. Botosan’s analysis of 122 manufacturing firms
supports the theory that an increase in financial disclosures is correlated with a lower cost
of equity. After controlling for market beta and the organization’s size, the magnitude of
the disclosure effect is negatively correlated with approximately 28 basis points change in
the cost of equity. However, organizations that had the most financial analysts covering
them had no significant relationship between disclosure levels and cost of equity capital.
(Elliott 2002) states the potential downside associated with more frequent
disclosures of financial reports: the potential to place the organization at a competitive
disadvantage, the high cost of developing, processing and distributing frequent financial
reports, and the risk of liability from its disseminations. Moreover, a field study of three
publicly traded firms reveals that only 10.6% of internal accounting professionals are
receptive to making financial statements available to external users on a more frequent
basis than quarterly and only 16.3% believe that the benefits of more frequent reporting
would outweigh the costs, even though most accounting and information technology
professionals believe that it is technically feasible to do so (Chan and Wright 2007).
Given the few audited disclosures, stock prices are routinely influenced by nonaudited information, which at times can be of dubious quality. For example, microcap
stocks, which notoriously lack publicly available audit information, have been plagued by
numerous “pump and dump” fraud schemes. Fraud perpetrators use a variety of tactics
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including spam, paid promoters, cold calling, and/or dubious press releases to artificially
increase a company’s stock prices ahead of their sell off (SEC 2014). More frequent and
widely distributed audited information could lead to more efficient markets by impeding
dubious information’s ability to sway stock prices.
3.4.6

Improved Trust

(Power 1999) asserts that the United Kingdom is in the midst of an “Audit Explosion”
because of a lack of trust. He suggests that auditing has been increasingly used to restore
trust in situations where resources are entrusted but trust is lacking.

However, all

auditing has explicit costs. Societies that have tried to institutionalize auditing on a grand
scale have slowly crumbled under the weight and cost of their information validation
demands. The over-allocation of scarce resources to surveillance activities and the sheer
human exhaustion of perpetual audit activities seem to outweigh their benefits. He
asserts that the traditional audit process invests too heavily in shallow rituals of
verification at the expense of other forms of organizational intelligence. The ultimate
goal of an audit program should be to open up an organization to independent and
external scrutiny thereby establishing broad-based trust, which obviates the need for
costly auditing.
Some have provided examples that Continuous Auditing could improve
organizational trust.

Continuous Auditing systems could monitor service level

agreements, contractual obligations and/or loan covenants between organizations, which
should improve trust between counterparties. For example, (Coletti, Sedatole et al. 2005)
suggests and provides evidence that control systems between organizations can increase
trust and reduce risk of organizational collaboration such as strategic alliances and joint
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ventures. Moreover, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) describes a continuous debt covenant
monitoring system that a lender could use to verify that a borrower complies with the
covenant agreements.

3.5 Adoption
Many believe Continuous Auditing is the future of auditing.

Continuous Auditing

techniques can be applied to a wide breadth of domain spaces.

On one extreme

Continuous Auditing has been used in very specific and well-defined domains (e.g.,
WebTrust and SysTrust). WebTrust’s sole purpose is to provide assurance on a website’s
privacy and consumer protection procedures, while SysTrust provides assurance on a
website’s security, availability and processing integrity (WebTrust.org 2009).
At the other extreme, Continuous Auditing could be the basis for an
organization’s enterprise-wide Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) program
(Caldwell 2009). Gartner defines Governance as the process by which policies are set
and decision-making is executed; Risk Management as the process for addressing risks
by either mitigation through the application of controls, transference through insurance
and/or acceptance through a governance mechanisms; and, Compliance as the process of
adhering to policies that can be derived from internal directives, procedures and
requirements or external laws, regulations, standards and agreements (Caldwell 2009). A
full-blown GRC Continuous Auditing installation at an arbitrarily complex Fortune 500
company would be a gigantic endeavor.
On an even grander scale, (Hulstijn, Christiaanse et al. 2011) explain how
Continuous Auditing could be used to ensure regulatory compliance through the entire
value chain for the meat processing industry: (i.e., feed creation, cattle farm,
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slaughterhouse, meat packing and retail). Hulstijn’s example crosses several distinct and
independent organizations that constitute the Netherlands’ meat packing industry.
However, the adoption rate of Continuous Auditing has been slow. A KPMG
survey indicated that fraud detection was the biggest factor driving adoption of
Continuous Audit systems.

The other drivers listed include: Enterprise Risk

Management, Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, compliance with internal policies and
procedures and regulatory compliance (2010).

A 2003 survey of internal auditors

conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research found that 79.4% of the
respondents used some form of computer assisted audit techniques and 39.9% use
computer-based monitoring and exception reporting in their departments (Warren 2003).
(Baksa, Turoff et al. 2010) summarizes three successful Continuous Audit
implementations at AT&T, RCMP and Siemens.

Kent and Zahid speculate how

Continuous Auditing could be embedded into health care systems (Kent, Zahid et al.
2011). The Financial Executive Research Foundation explored 11 successful Continuous
Auditing implementations at American Electric Power, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
North Carolina, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Hallmark Cards, Hewlett-Packard, IBM,
Intel, Microsoft, J.C. Penney, United Technologies Corporation and Wells Fargo
(Ramamoorti 2010).
The transition from traditional auditing techniques to Continuous Auditing is most
likely going to be a slow evolution rather than a dramatic metamorphosis. Kuenkaikaew
posits a four stage audit maturity model. In Stage 1 is the traditional audit, where
assurance is predicated on financial reports presented by management (Kuenkaikaew
2008). In Stage 2 assurance is predicated on effective control monitoring. In Stage 3
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assurance is predicated on verification of quantified controls and operational results. In
Stage 4 assurance is provided by a Continuous Audit with a meta-control structure and
audit by exception.
3.5.1

Success Criteria

A KPMG whitepaper (2010) defines several potential success criteria for a Continuous
Auditing implementation.

KPMG defines financial success criteria (e.g., positive

financial return on investment for the project) as well as non-financial success criteria
(e.g., improved employee compliance with policies and procedures). The positive return
on investment could stem from a reduction in the Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs,
increase prevention of fraud, reduction in the labor costs required to complete an audit,
and the cost savings associated with the enhanced ability to detect control failures quickly
before they have the chance to escalate into a costly issue. Over the course of the
Continuous Auditing system’s lifecycle success metrics, such as the ones listed above,
could be continually evaluated to determine the overall effect of this system on the
organization.
(Krell 2009) offers the following five suggestions to improve the adoption of a
Continuous Auditing implementation:
1. Establish highly visible executive support.
2. Communicate with business process owners to identify areas of greatest
need (i.e., most important risks).
3. Start small in a specific area with receptive business process owners.
4. Understand that the technology will likely identify "false positives" on the
first several cuts; weed these out as the application is iteratively optimized.
5. Communicate the errors and issues identified to business process owners
in a consultative manner.
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3.5.2

System Acceptance

In order for Continuous Auditing to become a mainstream application, it will have to
overcome the system acceptance issues that plague all new information technology
projects. Continuous Auditing could be used by many different stakeholders and may
face resistance along many different fronts. The three biggest potential stakeholders are
organizations, big accounting firms, and auditors (external and internal). Each of these
stakeholders has individual needs and desires that will help shape their reaction to a
Continuous Auditing system.
Also, for a Continuous Auditing system to be effective, it would not only have to
be proficient at auditing, but it would also have to be trusted and relied on by its
stakeholders. Trust in computer systems, especially new ones, can be problematic. For
example, six months before 40 million credit cards were stolen from Target, it spent $1.6
million on a sophisticated and well-known anti-malware system that detected the attack
and warned the appropriate personal, who took no action. In fact, this software could
have automatically removed the malware without any human interaction. However, this
feature was disabled, presumably because it was mistrusted by Target’s security
personnel, even though it was adequately tested both on Target’s infrastructure as well as
at numerous other companies (Riley, Elgin et al. 2014) (Smith 2014).
3.5.3

Organizational

Acceptance of an information technology system within an organization has been well
documented in the Information Systems literature. Specifically, (Bailey James 1983)
identified the five system attributes that lead to the highest user satisfaction with a
computer system:
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•

Accuracy - The correctness of the system’s output.

•

Reliability - The consistency and the dependability of system’s outputs.

•

Timeliness - The output of information in a time suitable for its use.

•

•

Relevance - The degree of congruence between what a user wants or
requires and what is provided by the system.
Confidence in the System - The user’s feeling of assurance or certainty
about the system.

Therefore, other things being equal, a Continuous Auditing system that exhibits a high
degree of these attributes should be more accepted than one that ranks low on them.
(Venkatesh, Morris et al. 2003) developed and tested a Unified Theory of
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), which can be used as a starting point to
understand the potential system acceptance issues that a Continuous Auditing system
could encounter. Four constructs were identified as direct determinants of user intention
and usage behavior:
•

•

•

•

Performance Expectancy (the degree to which an individual believes that
using the system will help him/her attain gains in job performance).
Effort Expectancy (the degree of effort associated with using and learning
the system).
Social Influence (the degree to which an individual perceives that
important constituents believe he or she should use the system).
Facilitating Conditions (the degree to which an individual believes that an
organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support use of the
system).

Gender, age, voluntariness and experience are key moderators of these four direct
determinants.

Performance Expectancy is moderated by gender and age.

This

relationship is more significant for men and younger workers. The Effort Expectancy is
moderated by gender, age and experience. This relationship is more significant for
women and older workers, and those with limited experience. The Social Influence is
contingent on all four moderators. This relationship is more significant for women, older
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workers, under conditions of mandatory use, and those with limited experience. The
effect of facilitating conditions is moderated by age and experience. This relationship
was more significant for older workers and those with more experience (Venkatesh,
Morris et al. 2003).
Consequently, UTAUT predicts high behavioral intention to use a new
Continuous Auditing System when the end-users believe that the Continuous Auditing
system is easy to use and well supported in terms of organizational and technical
infrastructure, will improve their efficiency and effectiveness at work, and is supported
by senior management. The prediction that a successful Continuous Auditing system
implementation benefits from the support of an executive champion is consistent with the
empirical research conducted by financial executives research foundation (Ramamoorti
2010).
3.5.4

The Big Four Auditing Firms

The big four accounting firms are PwC, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young, and
KPMG.

Collectively in 2011, these firms had revenues of over $100 billion and

employed over 640,000 employees. Table 3.1 summarizes this information.
Table 3.1

Big Four Auditing Firm’s Revenue and Number of Employees
Revenue
Employees
Fiscal
Audit
(in Billions) (in Thousands)
Year
Reference
PWC
$29.2
169 2011 (Davies 2011)
Deloitte & Touche
$28.8
182 2011 (2011)
Ernst & Young
$22.9
152 2011 (2011)
KPMG
$22.7
138 2010 (Flynn 2011)
Total
$103.6
641

36

Over the years, these large auditing firms have built a large and global industry, and
amassed substantial intellectual property around performing traditional audits.
Historically, these firms have been resistant to new technologies that could
potentially jeopardize their business model. For example, (Fischer 1996) observed that
large auditing firms had a reluctance to place reliance on more sophisticated and/or
effective audit procedures even when they were readily available. Their preferences
tended to be anchored on the audit procedures and processes that have been performed in
the past. Moreover, (Hall 2003) suggests that adoption of a new invention might be
slowed if it requires new and complex skills.

This inertia and resistance to new

technologies could be a barrier to Continuous Auditing acceptance. Finally, the Big 4
audit firms may be resistant to Continuous Auditing’s tenant of reviewing all the
transactions, because this practice could complicate their legal defenses for overlooking a
material financial misstatement.
(Dowling and Leech 2007) review of audit support systems may provide insight
into the performance expectancy for a Continuous Auditing system from the perspective
of the big audit firms. They conducted semi-structured interviews with four partners and
four managers from five audit firms, which included a Big 4 and one mid-tier
international audit firm. Continuous Auditing systems perceived benefits were enhanced
audit quality, increased audit efficiency, higher audit consistency, better risk
management, improved documentation and increased checks and balances on junior staff.
On the contrary, their perceived limitations include fostering mechanistic behavior as
opposed to judgment, significant training time, technology challenges, cost prohibitive
for certain types of tasks, and perceived complexity.
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One study suggests possible means to overcome these audit firm’s inertia and
initial resistance to new technologies. Curtis and Payne analyzed the acceptance in
auditing firms of Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs), which leverages
technology similar to what is used for a Continuous Auditing system (Curtis and Payne
2008). CAAT applies this technology within the context of a traditional periodic audit
while Continuous Auditing uses this technology to perform audits on a continuous basis.
He concludes that the acceptance of CAAT improves when superiors voice their approval
for the new CAAT software, and longer-term budget and evaluation periods are used.
Longer evaluation periods are necessary, because these implementations typically have
high front-loaded costs. In the early periods, these startup costs more than outweigh the
overall efficiency gains and improvements in audit quality. However, over time the
system implementation and maintenance costs tend to dramatically decrease while the
efficiency gains remain constant. For a well-designed system, the total economic benefits
of the system tend to surpass its total costs in some future period.
3.5.5

Auditors

Using Continuous Auditing systems will require new skills, technical competencies and
attitudes for both internal and external auditors.

Continuous Auditing will require

auditors to be open to adopt risk-based assurance principles and have a fundamental
understanding of Information Technology concepts and methodologies.

Specifically

auditors need to be able to teach themselves new technical solutions, perform data
extractions, use statistical analytical tools, and understand ERPs and mid-level
accounting packages (Vasarhelyi, Teeter et al. 2010). The Unified Theory of Acceptance
and Use of Technology theory predicts that auditors that have these abilities will have a
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lower Effort Expectancy (see Subsection 3.5.3) for using Continuous Auditing systems.
As such, they will be less resistant to this technology than auditors that do not have these
skills.
Another potential reason that auditors might resist a Continuous Auditing system
is, as automation increases audit efficiencies, there could be a corresponding decrease in
the demand for auditors. Similar to the way machines reduced the demand for physical
labor, some have argued that as machines take over mental labor, there will be a
corresponding and irrevocable reduction in the demand for knowledge workers (Ford
2009). Applying this line of reasoning to the audit profession, if Continuous Auditing
has large-scale success in fully automating the audit process, there could be a sharp
decrease in demand for the traditional auditor’s skill set. If auditors perceive a dire threat
to their livelihood, they may staunchly resist the new system.

3.6 Challenges
Although Continuous Auditing implementations are occurring, their adoption is slower
than expected (Warren 2003). Consequently, Continuous Auditing still has not been
widely adopted in corporate America, in spite of the fact that audit experts and software
vendors have touted its benefits for over a decade (Whitehouse 2010). However, one
study showed that Continuous Auditing techniques are emerging in some internal audit
departments, but much opportunity for additional proliferation (Vasarhelyi, Alles et al.
2012).
There are currently many technological, economic and logistical challenges facing
Continuous Auditing. Some examples include unclear benefits, high implementation
costs, few industry standards, limited customer demand, security concerns, unclear
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benefits and difficulties with data capture and mapping data between large and disparate
data sources (Penler 2006). Like all information system projects, Continuous Auditing
systems must balance innovation with efficiency, perpetually reconcile changing and
often conflicting user needs, and make difficult technology choices in a constantly
evolving landscape, which leads to unanticipated needs for new employee skills, user
training, the re-allocation of personnel and resources and the need to retire or integrate
with dated technologies (Patten 2009). Most large Information Systems projects have
material cost overruns or schedule overruns.

Moreover, roughly 17% of large

Information Systems projects go so badly that they threaten the existence of the entire
company (Bloch 2012). The following subsections explore the challenges that have been
described in the Continuous Auditing literature.
3.6.1

Cost

In September 2008, the Economist asked 446 senior executives about their views on the
drawbacks of investing in standardizing/automating their financial processes (Fedorowicz
2008). The number one drawback was the high level of investment required, which 48%
of the respondents gave as their answer. It was twice as much as the number two answer,
difficulty of modeling complex financial processes. Consequently, it is clear that the cost
of implementing a Continuous Auditing system is a formidable obstacle. One possible
approach to overcoming this cost objection is to phase the system in over time. In the
early phases of system development, the system implementer focuses on building the
high-value components and phases in the other lower value components over time.
While this approach does not directly lower the total cost of ownership, it does lower the
initial upfront costs and gives the user the high-value components first.
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Another approach to overcoming cost objections is to highlight the cost of doing
nothing. As Subsection 3.4.1 points out, there are tangible and intangible cost savings
associated with automating manual processes.

Moreover, Gartner suggests that

organizations that utilize a piecemeal approach to achieve their compliance initiatives
will likely spend ten times more on their compliance projects than an organization that
takes a more integrated approach (Brace 2006).

Table 3.2 compares the costs of

traditional auditing techniques with those of Continuous Auditing. Other things being
equal, the cost effectiveness case for Continuous Auditing seems to improve as the
organization’s scale increases.
Table 3.2

Traditional and Continuous Auditing Cost Comparison
Traditional Auditing
Continuous Auditing
Setup Time Cost
Less
More
Operating Costs
Proportional with sizes of
High initial development
organization. Fairly static
costs, but markedly drops
year over year.
after implementation
Cost of Audit
Varies based on exception
Preventative and/or near
Exception
but after-the-fact detection real-time should minimize
may lead to collateral cost
collateral costs of audit
exception
Cost to Scale Up
Very little economies of
High economies of scale.
scale
Minimal incremental cost to
add more sites and/or
controls

3.6.2

Inferior to Human Decision Making

The skeptics’ biggest criticism of Continuous Auditing is that it is not possible to fully
automate the auditing process.

They claim that the audit process requires human

judgment and estimation, which can never be fully automated nor done continuously
(Krass 2002). They argue that although Continuous Auditing may be able to detect a
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possible problem, a human will always be needed to confirm and/or mitigate it. For
example, a Continuous Audit process could detect a possible fraudulent credit card
transaction; however, a customer service representative would generally need to contact
the customer to confirm it.
Even a well-defined process can be difficult to automate. For example, in spite of
the fact that regulatory bodies painstakingly define standards and guidelines, and
organizations spend significant resources defining their business policies and controls,
determining whether a corporation is in compliance with a particular standard or
guideline still requires a fair amount of human judgment. To illustrate this point, each
year Money magazine sends the financial records of a hypothetical family to
approximately 50 tax preparers and asks them to determine how much this family owes in
taxes. In 1990, the family's tax bill ranged from $37,715 to $68,912, a difference of 83%.
The reason for this variation is that determining income, deductions and an appropriate
depreciation schedule is a subjective part of the tax preparer’s work.

Similarly,

organizations face a myriad of vastly more complicated but still ambiguous accounting
questions, whose answers can lend themselves to self-serving interpretations (Bazerman,
Loewenstein et al. 2002).
The skeptics’ basic premise is that some auditing data is simply too ambiguous to
fully automate the decision process. Peterson defines a continuum between hard and soft
data in a financial context (Peterson 2004).

Hard data is almost always recorded

numerically (e.g., income statements, balance sheets, etc.). In general, it can be easily
interpreted, summarized, and electronically collected, stored and transmitted.
Conversely, soft data is generally communicated by language (e.g., opinions, ideas,
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rumors, economic projections, etc.). Soft data requires more subjective interpretation
than hard data does. While soft data is more costly to produce, store and interpret,
Peterson concludes that soft data by its nature could contain more nuanced and
potentially useful information.
Expanding on the hard to soft data continuum (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) define
an audit data taxonomy that has three categories: (1) Routine Hard Data: audit data that is
clearly definable and easily interpreted and measured, (2) Non-routine Hard Data: Audit
data that requires information from other sources to be interpretable, (3) Soft Data (i.e.,
data with a high degree of subjectivity that requires some assumptions and judgment to
interpret). Consequently, routine hard data is the easiest to audit and soft data is the
hardest to audit.
Continuous Auditing systems can easily audit routine hard data (e.g., does a user
entering transactions into the general ledger system have the proper authority to make
this type of transaction, have any unauthorized changes been made to key system tables,
and are the calculations in the system performed correctly?). At the other end of the
spectrum, auditing soft data would likely require the application to use some form of
artificial intelligence techniques.
(Simon 1966) claimed back in the 1960’s that machines will be capable, within
twenty years, of doing any work a human can do. Although artificial intelligence, thus
far, has not lived up to these early expectations, in some small well-defined areas it has
been able to equal or outperform humans.

For example, the artificial intelligence

program deep blue has beaten the world's best grandmasters at chess (Loeb 2006).
Watson has beat some of the world’s best players at Jeopardy (Markoff 2011). Also,
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artificial intelligence is replacing skilled practitioners in fields such as law, medicine and
aviation (Dewhurst and Willmott 2014). For example, pilots are flying airplanes less and
less because they rely more and more on flight automation that has become reliable and
efficient, and eliminates the risk of pilot fatigue. However, these automation controls are
not foolproof. Some have believe that they played a role in the 2009 Air France crash
that killed 228 passengers, which paints a cautionary tale of the perils of designing an
automated control system that does not cleanly mesh with our innate human
understanding or the world (Wise 2011).
Recent advances in deep learning techniques have led to renewed enthusiasm
among researchers that automating some types of human tasks is becoming increasingly
plausible in the foreseeable future (Markoff 2012). Some have predicted that Artificial
Intelligence will reach human level by 2029 (Devlin 2015). Others have even heralded
the next wave of artificial intelligence that could result in a paradigm shift for senior
executives (McKinsey 2014).

However, it still remains unclear whether similar

technology could be used to create superior artificially intelligent auditors.
One formidable obstacle is that complex business decisions may require multicriteria decision-making, which refers to decisions that have conflicting criteria and
require implicit or explicit tradeoffs between competing objectives. These types of
decisions generally require the aggregation of input from various disparate parties that
very well may have sharply different views, responsibilities and objectives. Benjamin
Franklin suggested a process to make a multi-criteria decision: simplifying the decision
process by simultaneously removing even swaps from a decision’s pros and cons column
until the best decision becomes apparent (Hammond, Keeney et al. 2001).
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Etzioni

champions a humbled decision making model, which has been used by physicians for
centuries (Etzioni 2001). This model requires an understanding of organizational goals
and policies, and advocates small, nonbinding and experimental decisions based on indepth examination of a focused subset of facts and possible decisions.
A contemporary solution to the multi-criteria decision-making problem, which
was suggested by emergency management research, is to combine a real-time decision
support system that provides consistent and comprehensive information with a structured
approach that allows experts to model decisions and their effects (Roethlisberger 1939).
Turoff defines a theoretical emergency management system that combines decision
support templates, Continuous Auditing of a predefined set of emergency preparedness
controls and Continuous Auditing of the decision process to establish oversight and
accountability (Turoff 2004).
3.6.3

Automation Issues

Software developers have relied on automated testing tools to validate the correctness of
a software project. Continuous integration, which is a software engineering practice that
advocates implementing continuous processes as a means for quality control, has been
pushing the boundaries of automation in software development. Continuous integration
recommends automating the build and unit testing processes such that they are
automatically executed every time a software module is changed. One of the advantages
of continuous integration is software bugs emerge early in the development process.
However, the disadvantages are increased set up time, and the cost of developing an
adequate unit test suite and purchasing the requisite hardware and software (Roebuck
2011).
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Continuous Auditing, which aspires to a much grander scale of automation, will
likely face similar, if not materially more difficult, automation challenges. The cost of
developing and maintaining automated tests have been higher than expected (Ramler and
Wolfmaier 2006). There is the upfront cost of determining which automation tool to buy
and learning how to use it. Then, there is the ongoing cost of developing, executing and
maintaining the automated tests. Developing a suite of automated tests generally require
costly, highly specialized and technically competent resources that understand the testing
tool as well as the underlying domain space.
Even highly automated tests still require a fair amount of human supervision. For
example, each time the test suite is executed the results need to be carefully reviewed to
determine the false positives from the real issues. Moreover, automated tests may also
require human intervention to fix broken tests and resolve technical snafus such as
memory problems, network glitches and, perhaps, even bugs with the testing tool itself.
Changes to the underlying information technology systems or the audit objectives are
likely to necessitate a corresponding change in the tests suite as well.
Automated tests tend to be rigid. In general, automated tests have difficulty
coping with rapidly changing environments or environments where the underlying
domain space is not well understood. In these environments, automated testing may not
even be a viable option (Bach 1999). Berner and Weber concludes that automated testing
cannot fully replace manual testing (Berner, Weber et al. 2005). They also point out that
the capability to run automated test cases diminishes, if they are not used. In conclusion,
automated testing has been effective in certain domains; however, it has some systemic
issues that have limited its overall effectiveness. It is highly probable that those seeking
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to implement a Continuous Auditing system will wrestle with the same type of
automation issues, albeit on a grander scale, as what test engineers encountered when
they build automated test scripts for Information Systems.
Having to regularly update and improve a Continuous Auditing system is
probably inevitable except for the extremely rare environment that never changes and is
totally free from the surprises caused by human missteps, competing organizations and
natural events. Therefore, model and test updates probably should be viewed as a routine
exercise that if not done regularly will cause the accuracy of the system to steadily decay.
Practically speaking, there probably should be a periodic recheck of automated predictive
models at least once a year to verify the fidelity of their forecasts.
Finally, Exception Reporting, which was first proposed by the father of scientific
management (Taylor 1911), highlights the inherent problem of defining exactly what
“exceptions” to a business process are (Gorr 2009). The number of possible exceptions is
nearly infinite. Even with large-scale data mining, there is always the possibility that an
abnormal finding has not yet been captured in an organizational database, which greatly
exasperates the modeling process.
3.6.4

System Performance

Adding Continuous Auditing controls and/or data extraction methods (see Subsection
4.2.3) to an existing IT system may negatively impact system performance. Hoxmeier
concludes that user satisfaction with an IT system decreases as response time increases
(Hoxmeier 2000).

In the best case, lengthy system response times will lower user

productivity and, in the worst case, render the system unusable.
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(Murthy 2004) examined the system performance implications of adding three
types of controls (calculations, database lookups, and aggregate function controls) to an
e-commerce application. Calculation controls make comparisons between the current
transaction and data retrieved from a single database lookup. Lookup controls are similar
to calculation controls but require data from multiple tables. Aggregate function controls
compare transaction values to the average, sum, maximum and/or minimum of a
particular field. For example, one aggregate control compares the customer’s current
transaction amount to the customer’s average historical amount. Murthy concludes that
calculation controls could be accommodated, regardless of system load. Lookup controls
had a detrimental effect on system performance only during peak periods. Aggregate
function controls had a dramatic negative impact on system performance irrespective of
the system load.
However, as information technology systems continue to become more powerful,
the system performance concerns over Continuous Auditing may diminish in materiality.
Today’s highly scalable and distributed computing grids can quickly process a
tremendous amount of data. For example in 2011, Facebook processed over 30 billion
pieces of content each month (Manyika, Chui et al. 2011).
3.6.5

Formalizing Business Processes

A September, 2008 Economist study asked 446 senior executives their opinions on how
to improve financial processes. In response to the question “What is the biggest problem
with current financial processes?” the top three issues were: (1) Too many manual
processes (2) Complex procedures which are difficult to model or automate
(3) Inconsistent methodologies around the organization (Fedorowicz 2008).
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Continuous Auditing strives to mitigate these issues through the formalization of
business processes, controls and audit exceptions. Knowledge Management, which has
been extensively researched (Malone, Crowston et al. 2003), attempts to formalize,
organize, describe and leverage the intellectual capital that has been embedded in
business process routines and machinery (Davenport and Prusak 2000) and could serve as
a basis for a Continuous Auditing system. In general, formalization promotes precision
and consistency, improves confidence in audit results and reduces long run audit costs.
Once a business process has been formalized, it can usually be automated.
Unfortunately, many humans resist formal thinking, formalization can be very laborious
and costly and some complex judgments are not amenable to formalization (Alles,
Brennan et al. 2006). Consequently, formalizing manual audit procedures to facilitate
automation is much more difficult than might have been anticipated (Alles, Brennan et al.
2006).
Conventional audit programs may not be designed for automation because
formalization and judgmental procedures are often intermixed. In order to optimally
automate the audit process, the whole process may need to be reengineered. Wherever
practical, continuous automated procedures should be relied on, and manual methods
and informal judgmental procedures should be eliminated (Alles 2008).
3.6.6

Information Overload

Continuous Auditing systems could increase the quantity of data available for analysis,
which could cause information overload. Information overload occurs when the volume
of information supplied in a given unit of time exceeds the limited human information
processing capacity, which tends to lead to confused and dysfunctional behavior (Jacoby,
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Speller et al. 1974). Chewning and Harrell demonstrated that an overload of accounting
data leads to decreased decision quality in accounting students (Chewning and Harrell
1990).
The Information Systems literature explores possible solutions to the information
overload problem: installing voting structures to evaluate information (Hiltz and Turoff
1985), using decision support systems (Cook 1993) or intelligent agents to limit
alternatives (Edmunds and Morris 2000), providing flexible information organization,
filtering and routing options (Hiltz and Turoff 1985), utilizing data visualization tools
(Chan 2001), creating a measurement system for information quality (Denton 2001),
compressing, aggregating and categorizing data (Grise and Gallupe 1999), defining
decision models (Chewning and Harrell 1990) or exception reporting (Ackoff 1967), and
using search procedures (Olsen, Sochats et al. 1998).
Siemens designed their Continuous Auditing system to prevent information
overload by implementing an exception-based approach built around intelligent alarms.
When critical exceptions occur, the system automatically generates alarms, which are
emailed to all relevant parties. To prevent alarm floods, which occur when the same
alarm is repeatedly sounded, from hampering the ability to react to the underlying
problems and, in the worst case, having the alarm ignored altogether, a hierarchical alarm
structure was implemented where each node has an enabled/disabled flag. Disabling the
node prevents its children’s alarms from sounding, thereby preventing alarm floods.
Moreover, the system intelligently monitors alarms, waits a predefined amount of time
before re-sounding an alarm and initiates escalation procedures if an alarm is not resolved
within a given timeframe (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006).
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION SYSTEMS

4.1 Architecture
This chapter surveys the enabling Information System technologies for Continuous
Auditing and Monitoring systems. At the highest level all Information Systems require a
software architecture.

A software architecture is defined as “the fundamental

organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relationships to each other
and the environment, and the principles governing its design and evolution” (ANSI/IEEE
2000, p. 3). Although much has been written about empirical and theoretical Continuous
Auditing architectures, there is still disagreement on the optimal system architecture.
Gartner defines the critical capabilities of the Continuous Auditing system as: Detection
and Preventing of Conflicting Privileges (i.e., ensuring that an employee does not have
system access that violates the organization’s Segregation of Duty (SOD) policy),
transaction monitoring (i.e., periodically run predefined analytics to identify control
exceptions), auditor and management workflows (i.e., supports tracking and remediation
audit exceptions) and cross-platform integration (i.e., the ability to extract data and track
business processes across multiple ERP systems and home-grown financial application)
(Proctor and Caldwell 2010).
(Alles, Kogan et al. 2004) generically describe the seven components of a
Continuous Auditing system:
1. A layer of software (aimed at process control and monitoring) on top of
the most critical corporate software systems.
2. An instantiation of the control and monitoring process aimed at business
process assurance by both internal and external assurors.
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3. A constant stream of measurements (metrics) engineered out of key
processes.
4. A sophisticated dynamic set of standards (models) to compare with the
metrics.
5. A set of dynamic exception metrics to determine when an alarm is to be
issued, and its degree of importance.
6. An analytic layer to perform additional analysis related to several
corporate functions (auditing, fraud evaluation, accounting rule
compliance, estimate review).
7. A new level of statutory reporting that may include reports to
governmental agencies.
One possible extension of this approach is to incorporate periodic revalidation of the
model’s efficacy on a regular basis. This review should be consistent with the rate of
external changes that affect the organization’s operation.
(Warren 2005) describes a web enabled software architecture that receives a
continuous feed of data from a variety of enterprise systems and performs Continuous
Auditing, audits and control checks on this data. Ye posits that a Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA) Continuous Auditing architecture would provide faster business
value, rapid response capabilities and reuse (Huanzhuo Ye 2008). Woodroof and Searcy
adds the concept of continually combining data from multiple disparate organizations
(Woodroof and Searcy 2001). The auditor’s website aggregates information from three
disparate entities (the client, its supplier, and an independent valuation engine) to
generate Continuous Auditing reports.

Alles and Brennan adds the notion that

formalizable procedures should be separated from non-formalizable ones, where the
formalizable controls are executed with high frequency (perhaps continuously), while
non-formalizable ones should continue to be done manually and periodically (Alles,
Brennan et al. 2006).
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4.2 Information Management
(Marchand, Kettinger et al. 2000) defines Information management capability as the
ability to provide data and information to users with the appropriate level of accuracy,
timeliness, reliability, security and confidentiality. An effective Continuous Auditing
system would require strong information management and governance practices
(Caldwell, Wheatman et al. 2009).

Although today's organizations are not entirely

paperless, technologies such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce
(EC), and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) are greatly increasing the number of digitized
audit trails while simultaneously reducing the number of paper based ones. Redgrave
estimates that 93% of information created today is in a digital form, 70% of an
organization's records are stored electronically and 30% of electronically stored
information is never printed (Redgrave 2005).

The trend towards digitizing an

organization’s audit trails is a necessary prerequisite to Continuous Auditing, because at
the core of any Continuous Auditing system is electronically stored data.

If this

electronic data can be properly aggregated and structured, it could likely be used to
satisfy multiple governance and business reporting needs (Hannon 2005).
4.2.1

Big Data

The global economy is generating a tremendous volume of transactional data, which
includes trillions of bytes of information about customers, suppliers and business
processes. If this data can be appropriately harvested, it could be transformed into a
major corporate asset. For example, GE turned the 50 million data points generated from
the ten million sensors embedded in the wide array of products it has sold into an
estimated annual $1 billion predictive maintenance revenue stream (Clancy 2014).
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Big Data seeks to analyze and create value from a massive data set. However, big
data has some notable limitations: It increases the number of spurious statistically
significant correlations, has difficulty modeling the strength of social relationships and
understanding the contextual decision-making framework. Moreover, Big Data can be
riddled with some latent predispositions and perceptual biases imbued by its creator and
will be of only marginal usefulness in black swan events (i.e., novel situations where no
pre-existing representative data exists) (Brooks 2013).

Finally in the audit context,

exhaustingly analyzing Big Data sets could generate a prohibitive number of audit
exceptions, which would be difficult to manually review and process on either timely or
cost effective basis.
Two of the objectives of Big Data research are similar to the goals of Continuous
Audit: 1) Creating Organizational Transparency by making the data more understandable
to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner. 2) Replacing/supporting human decision
making with automated algorithms that could lead to improved decision making,
minimized operational risks, and potentially lead to new and valuable insights (Manyika,
Chui et al. 2011).
4.2.1 Database Management Systems
A Continuous Auditing system will almost certainly require some form of Database
Management System (e.g., SQLServer, Oracle, DB2, etc.). Alles and Brennan propose
that a large relational database application is an appropriate tool for an Audit Data
Repository (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006). Most modern database systems have SQL-based
querying capabilities that allow selecting, aggregating and filtering the data stored in the
database.

Moreover, these database management systems generally have Extract
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Transform and Load (ETL), Data Warehouse, Data Mining and Predictive Modeling.
Warren suggested that these capabilities could be key components of a Continuous
Auditing System (Warren 2003). ETL tools help extract data from other IT systems,
transform it into the current database model and load the data into a database. A Data
Warehouse organizes information stored in the database to facilitate end-user reporting
and analytics. Data Mining is a systematic process for extracting patterns from data (e.g.,
fraudulent transactions). Predictive modeling creates a model based on the underlying
data that is used to predict future results, activity or behavior.
4.2.2

Data Sources

Few organizations have a completely homogeneous system environment. In an (ACL
2006) survey of 858 audit executives in organizations with annual revenues in excess of
$100 million, over half of the respondents (58%) felt that fragmented and incomplete data
was an extremely important issue facing their organization; 28% felt it was important;
11% indicated it was slightly important; and only 3% of respondents felt that this was not
a key challenge in their organization at this time.
Typically, organizations have a complex IT environment, which could be
composed of a hodgepodge of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems or perhaps
multiple instances of the same ERP, mainframe systems, off the shelf applications and
legacy systems, all of which may contain valuable data to the auditor (ACL 2006). Some
of the Continuous Auditing literature mentions the concept of an Audit Data Repository,
which ideally contains all the data needed for an audit and organizes it from an audit
perspective.
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Practically speaking, the economics of saving, organizing and managing all this
data could be prohibitively expensive. Moreover, there could be political problems that
stem from providing auditors unfettered access to this information. Alles and Brennan
posits the greatest opportunity for reducing the volume of data stored in an Audit Data
Repository is adjusting the retention requirements such that data is only retained if it
generates exceptions that require follow-up. Since all other data is purged, the total data
stored, and potential security and confidentiality risks are reduced (Alles, Brennan et al.
2006).
A couple of papers have described Continuous Auditing systems that were based
on ERP systems. Kuhn described a hypothetical Continuous Auditing system built on top
of an ERP system similar to the one used by WorldCom (Kuhn 2006).

Alles and

Brennan describe Siemens’ Continuous Auditing system built on top of their SAP
systems (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006).
(Rezaee 2002) proposes a data mart that does not necessarily require an ERP
system. Data marts collect and transform data from various business units. The data are
transformed and stored in an audit data server for easy access, analysis, and reporting. An
integrated audit data mart must have the following characteristics:
•
•

•

•

Integrated query, analysis, and reporting through a unified user interface,
Easy-to-use yet powerful enough for the most sophisticated analytical
users,
Capacity to easily export queries to common spreadsheets and database
systems,
A query engine capable of retrieving and processing large volumes of
data,

•

Data aggregation and multidimensional database capability,

•

Advanced statistical modeling and data exploration capabilities,

•

Data visualization for data mining exploration,
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•

The ability to drill down into different degrees of data aggregation.

The Table 4.1 summarizes the difference between ERP and Audit Warehouse Continuous
Auditing solutions.
Table 4.1

ERP versus Audit Warehouse
ERP
Optimized for transactional
Data Storage
processing
Potential Scope of
ERP System only
Data
Require ETL

No – All analysis is done off
of ERP’s internal databases
Generally no. All analysis is
Data Latency Issues performed on the ERP’s
internal data stores

Audit Warehouse
Optimized for Audit Analysis
All digital systems including
multiple ERPs
Yes – Data must be
continually aggregated from
multiple systems
Yes – Data could become stale
between refreshes

Both approaches are used in commercial applications. Data 2 Knowledge is an
example of a data mart without an ERP (D2K 2005). Data 2 Knowledge transforms the
contents of an unlimited number of log files into a single structure database. Approva’s
Bizrights is an example of a Continuous Auditing implementation that requires an ERP
solution, such as Oracle, PeopleSoft, SAP or J.D. Edwards ERP. Bizrights continually
scans these ERP’s databases for potential audit exceptions such as duplicate payments,
nonstandard payment terms, cash payments to vendors, invoices without purchase orders,
etc. (Approva 2009).
(Murthy and Groomer 2004) theorized how extensible markup language (XML)
and Web services could be utilized to create a Continuous Auditing Web Service
(CAWS). CAWS could be used by an external auditor to extract data from an auditee’s
IT system(s) on demand. This data could be analyzed and potentially aggregated with
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data from other companies in the supply chain to produce a real-time assurance report for
other counterparties (i.e., investors, analysts, financial institutions, etc.). They suggest
that Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) or eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL) standards are a plausible foundation for CAWS. In one example, they
depicted an XBRL GL implementation that used a Data Hub (i.e., Data Mart).
(Vasarhelyi 2004) suggests transaction tagging, which tracks transactions as they
flow between applications, would be a useful data point for a Continuous Auditing
system. The transaction tag for the data would include the source, description and
validation information that would enable the Continuous Auditing system to monitor and
evaluate data accuracy and integrity.
4.2.3

Data Extraction

The Continuous Auditing literature identifies two possible approaches for extracting the
requisite data from enterprise systems:

the Embedded Audit Module (EAM) and

Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL). Embedded audit modules capture information of
audit significance on a continuous basis (Groomer and Murthy 1989).
EAMs are generally application level code that is specifically written to identify
and continually write to a log file certain key business events.

This log file is

subsequently reviewed by auditors. For example, EAM could be written to identify all
purchase orders that exceed a certain predefined threshold. Once a purchase order that
exceeds a threshold is entered into the system being monitored an exception record would
immediately appear on the audit log. This file would be used by auditors to manually
review the most risky purchases. Since only data for key business events are extracted,
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the data are extracted with minimal strain on the underlying systems in terms of
processing time, disk IO and network bandwidth.
Although EAM can reduce the strain of data extraction, extracting large volumes
of data could still degrade the performance of the production system. Using EAM
ghosting, where the entire production system including data and system settings is cloned
onto separate hardware could totally alleviate the data extraction burden from the
production system. The “ghost” production system would have EAM data extraction
enabled and the real production environment would not. Leveraging techniques similar
to disaster recovery and fail over solutions, EAM ghosting could be implemented by
either having a replica of the production hardware, (e.g., perhaps by reusing the quality
assurance testing environment) or through virtualization (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). At
predefined intervals, the data from the real production system would be copy to the ghost
production system.
(Debreceny, Gray et al. 2005) studied EAM within the content ERP systems.
Kuhn extends this research to SAP’s ABAP programming language that enables the
creation of custom audit rules that can evaluate SAP transactions in real-time, and
generate reports and alarms when transactions violate these audit rules (Kuhn Jr and
Sutton 2010).
The MCL is generally implemented at the database level and periodically extracts
all relevant data from the ERP database into a monitoring and control layer. The MCL
data structure is optimized to facilitate the tasks that auditors normally perform
(Vasarhelyi 2004). For example, an auditor could use the MCL layer to drill down to the
individual transactions and perform aggregate analysis at any level.
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For additional

security, the MCL could be stored off-site, which would make it highly resistant to
modification and tampering, even from internal IT employees with the highest systemlevel access. (Coderre 2005) identifies three less automated data extraction methods:
1. Run copies of standard reports and save reports in electronic format for
further analysis.
2. Run queries or generate reports with a report writer.
3. Obtain physical and logical access to the client system and sign on as a
user with read-only access.
The Table 4.2 summarizes the main differences between EAM and MCL data extraction
methods.
Table 4.2

Summary of EAM and MCL Data Extraction
EAM
MCL
Continuously
Periodically
Extract Frequency
Application Level
Database Level
Extraction Point
Exception Data
All Data
Data Extracted
Data extraction requires
Data is less vulnerable to
Primary Advantage
minimal system resources
manipulation by enterprise
personnel who have superuser privileges especially
when it is stored in a off-site
database
Audit Modules are tightly
Requires frequent and system
Primary
coupled with enterprise
intensive data extracts.
Disadvantage
system, so creating Audit
Modules requires detailed
understanding of the
enterprise system.

4.2.4

Information Security

Like all of an organization’s Information Systems, a Continuous Auditing system should
conform to the organization’s information security policy. There have been numerous
standards published on information security policies (Höne and Eloff 2002). Loch and
Carr states the primary objective of information security is to protect Information
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Systems and its data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification
or destruction in order to ensure the information system’s integrity, confidentiality and
availability (Loch, Carr et al. 1992).
Information security has been mentioned in Continuous Auditing literature.
Woodroof and Searcy identifies four data security attributes for the Continuous Auditing
system:
1. Authorization: Information is limited to only authorized users, which can
be accomplished through passwords and/or biometric devices.
2. Confidentiality: using various encryption techniques to ensure the privacy
of transmitted information.
3. Integrity: the ability to detect when the underlying data has been tampered
with.
4. Authentication: the ability to determine the original source of the data
(Woodroof and Searcy 2001).
For a Continuous Auditing system, (Alles 2008) adds the following security concerns:
•

Location of the Continuous Auditing hardware (i.e., the corporation’s
premises or the auditor’s premises),

•

Physical access security,

•

Logical access security,

•

Super-user privileges,

•

IT personnel access to the Continuous Auditing system’s internal security
settings.

However, Information security topics such as business continuity, disaster recovery,
cryptography and availability have received less attention in the Continuous Auditing
literature.
Continuous Auditing has been used to ensure that an organization’s key
Information Systems comply with its security policy. Harrison states the two main
benefits of continuously auditing an organization’s information technology controls are
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timely notification of threatening conditions, and avoiding the high cost and low
effectiveness task of manually sampling security logs (Harrison 2005). Siemens uses
Continuous Auditing techniques to monitor SAP's password and user access policies
(Alles, Brennan et al. 2006). Therefore, a Continuous Auditing system could be designed
to monitor its own compliance with the organization's security policies.

4.3 Analytical Methods
Continuous Auditing seeks to improve the audit process by continually applying
predefined analytical methods to impartially analyze vast amounts of data (e.g., financial
transactions, application configuration settings and customer data). Analytical methods
can consider nearly an unlimited number of factors, provide deep insights and scale to
meet the needs of even the largest company. However, these methods can also be
perilously misled by bad data and false assumptions (Redman 2014).
These analytic methods are designed to identify control exceptions (Caldwell
2009). There is a long lineage of research that suggests just the act of continually
monitoring a process tends to improve its overall quality. The Hawthorne effect, where
subjects improve an aspect of their behavior that is being experimentally measured
simply in response to being studied and not in response to an experimental manipulation,
was first documented in (Roethlisberger 1939). More recently, various Total Quality
Management processes have used continual analysis as a way to improve business
process. For example, Six Sigma has a five-step process:
1. Define the process and high-level objectives,
2. Measure key aspects of the current process,
3. Analyze the data to determine cause-and-effect relationships,
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4. Determine what the key relationships are,
5. Optimize the process based upon data analysis techniques (Pyzdek 2009).
Using feedback to improve analytical methods is a powerful technique as evidenced by
the steady improvement in models that predict weather. For example, the average error
in maximum temperature prediction was six degrees Fahrenheit in the 1970s and just 4
degrees in 2010 (Rosenzweig 2014).
As the time to complete an audit shrinks, the necessity of relying on fully
automated programmatic solutions to identify audit exceptions increases. There have
been many research articles that have suggested various analytical methods that could be
used in a Continuous Auditing system to identify audit exceptions. These analytical
methods all share the following properties: observing events in real or near real-time,
generating alarms when exceptions occur and performing repeat tests quickly, continually
and with low variable costs (Vasarhelyi 2004). The following subsections describe the
most promising analytical methods in more detail.
4.3.1

Belief Functions

A belief function allows the combination of evidence from several different sources to
calculate the degree of belief that utilizes all the available evidence. There have been
several journal articles speculating that belief functions would be useful in a Continuous
Audit system.

For example, (Srivastava and Shafer 1992) used a belief function

framework to calculate the total plausibility of a material misstatement at the financial
statement, account and audit objective levels.
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4.3.2

Continuity Equations

Continuity equations use statistical models to capture relationships between various
business processes. They can be used to create expectation models for how data moves
through a business process. Continuity equations are developed using statistical methods
(e.g., Linear Regression Modeling, Simultaneous Equation Modeling, Multivariate Time
Series Modeling, Vector Autoregressive Model, Subset-VAR or Bayesian-VAR).
There is a three-step process to modeling a business process with continuity
equations:
1. Choose a business process to model (e.g., purchasing, payments, inventory
etc.).
2. Define metrics to represent each process: (e.g., dollar amount of purchase
orders, quantity of items received, or number of payment vouchers
processed).
3. Choose the levels of aggregation of metrics (By time: hourly, daily,
weekly; by business unit; by customer or vendor; by type of products or
services; etc.).
The model’s prediction accuracy can be compared using statistical methods such as Mean
Absolute Percentage Error, Mean Absolute Error or Symmetric Mean Absolute Percent
Error.
4.3.3

Expert Systems

Expert Systems are an artificial intelligence technique that encapsulates the knowledge of
one or more human experts in a series of rules. Typically, expert systems are well suited
for static and narrowly defined problem sets that lend themselves to analytical solutions.
Within an auditing context, (Coderre 2009) asserts that expert systems would be wellsuited to provide consistency across audits that are performed at different locations or
clients.
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(Davis, Massey et al. 1997) combined the deductive power of a rule-based system
with the inductive power of a neural net to assess the audit risk embedded in an
organization’s control structure. Essentially, Davis calculated the probability that an
entity’s control structure would fail to prevent or detect significant financial
misstatements. Siegel and Strawser use rough set theory, which is an analytical method
that generates a compact set of rules from an empirical set of multivariate data, to
develop decision rules for evaluating internal controls (Siegel, Strawser et al. 1998).
These decision rules were based on expert assessment of control risk after considering
certain control procedures surrounding the decision. The paper concludes that these rules
allowed non-experts to make decisions comparable to those made by firm-wide experts.
Similarly, (Greco, Matarazzo et al. 1998) applied rough set theory to evaluate bankruptcy
risks.
4.3.4

Fuzzy Sets

Fuzzy logic is an analytical method that linguistically describes a process using a
combination of fuzzy sets and rules. Unlike traditional logic theory, which has only a
binary true-false set, fuzzy logic has a degree of membership construct that could assume
any value from between zero to one inclusive. Dhar and Stein suggests that fuzzy logic is
an intuitive and flexible way to describe the behaviors of very complex systems. Fuzzy
logic has been mentioned in the Continuous Auditing literature (Dhar and Stein 1997).
For example, (Deshmukh, Nassiripor et al. 1998) illustrates how lenders could improve
their decision-making by using fuzzy sets to assess short-term liquidity risks. The paper
concludes that this model is superior to traditional measures of liquidity. Deshmukh and
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Romine built a fuzzy logic model to determine whether an accounting firm should either
initiate or continue a relationship with a client (Deshmukh, Romine et al. 1998).
4.3.5

Neural Net

Neural Nets are a predictive modeling technique that simulates the workings of the
human mind. Coakley used a neural net to detect material errors in monthly financial
ratios (Coakley 1995). Two separate journal articles used neural nets to detect concerns
in financial statements’ ratios and values (Hian Chye and Sen Suan 1999) (Etheridge,
Sriram et al. 2000). Koskivaara used neural nets to recognize patterns in the monthly
balances of financial accounts (Koskivaara 2000).
Moreover, (Ramamoorti, Jr et al. 1999) used 26 quantitative and 19 qualitative
risk factors as input into a neural net to assess internal auditing risk at the University of
Illinois. The quantitative data were extracted from the Financial and Administration
Systems. The qualitative risk factors were ranked by the audit staff using a Delphi,
which was used to train the neural nets. Ramamoorti concludes that internal auditors
could benefit from using neural nets.
In general, neural nets tend to perform well when, data samples and the range of
values to be analyzed are large, the data does not conform to strict distributional
properties and the underlying associations among the data are ill defined. However,
neural nets are difficult to explain conceptually (i.e., how and why they arrived at the
conclusion they did) and do not readily allow the calculation of statistical significance for
the model’s variables (Calderon and Cheh 2002).
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4.3.6

Regression-based

Regression analysis is a predictive modeling technique based upon statistical methods.
Knechel compared seven regression based analytical review procedures on monthly
account balances (Knechel 1988). When these rules identified months with inordinately
high variance, the auditor would randomly sample and manually review the transactions
within these periods. Knechel concluded that allowing regression based analytical review
procedures to guide the auditor’s transaction review was an efficient approach, because
even in the worst-case, most analytical review procedures in spite of their smaller
samples sizes still had only a small increase in detection risk versus traditional sampling
techniques.
(Vasarhelyi 2004) recommends using time series/cross-sectional analysis to
model the normal behavior so that audit exceptions can be detected.

In general,

regression based statistical techniques are easily explainable and their variables’
significance can be easily calculated. However, regression based statistical techniques
force the underlying data into a preselected distribution (e.g., normal, logarithmic, etc.),
which may not fit the underlining data distribution.
4.3.7

Qualitative

Soft information may need to be incorporated into a Continuous Auditing system. In this
context, soft information is defined as management estimates and/or judgments (e.g.,
calculating and allowance for doubtful accounts or determining a new organizational risk
are examples of auditing tasks that require a fair amount of human judgment) (Warren
2002). In order to incorporate soft information into a Continuous Auditing system it
must be electronically captured.

Since this process requires human input, strictly
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speaking it could not occur continuously, but potentially could be a source of valuable
information that would be difficult to obtain using other analytical methods.
One qualitative method that can be used to digitize human judgment is an
electronic questionnaire. An electronic questionnaire can range from a simple true-false
questionnaire form to a complex interactive form dynamically leading the user through
relative questions based on previous answers (Coderre 2009).

On an electronic

questionnaire, the question types could be nominal (e.g., yes/no), ordinal (e.g., Strongly
Agree (5) Agree (4) Neither Agree or Disagree (3) Disagree (2) Agree (1) Strongly
Agree), interval (e.g., a scale from 1 to 100), open ended, or any combination of the
aforementioned.
Another electronic qualitative approach is the Delphi method, which is an
interactive forecasting model that would rely on a panel of independent experts either
inside or outside the organization. These experts would answer preselected questions in
multiple rounds. After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the
expert’s forecast from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for their
answers. In the next round, the panel could revise their answers based upon input from
the previous round.

This process continues until a predefined stop criterion (e.g.,

achievement of consensus, stability of the round’s results, etc.) is reached (Linstone
1975). A Delphi study was used to predict the answers to some of the open questions in
Continuous Auditing. The Delphi predicted that by 2020, 68% of the external audits and
78% of the internal audits will be automated (Vasarhelyi, Lombardi et al. 2010).

68

The Delphi process could be used to build collaborative models that aggregate the
collective wisdom of multiple experts, and help detect and mitigate risks. Linstone and
Turoff review of the current status of the Delphi method makes two important points:
1. Collaborative Model Building is currently a major Delphi research
objective.
2. While the Web has ushered in the "age of participation", we need new
types of software to get us to the "age of collaboration." (Linstone and
Turoff 2011)
Bañuls and Turoff explain how a Delphi process, Cross Impact Analysis and
Interpretive Structure Modeling could be used to produce collaborative models (Bañuls
and Turoff 2011). They created dynamic scenarios with influence relationships such that
modifying any event’s probability shows its impact to all the other events. Bañuls,
Turoff explore collaborative modeling within the context of a dirty bomb exploding in an
urban area (Bañuls, Turoff et al. 2013). It demonstrates that a group of professionals
could build collaborative models without any programming skills. For other types of
risks, it may be possible to use this same technique to create working models that were
informed by a cross-functional array of domain experts.

4.4 Alarms
Alarms are an early warning system that let stakeholders know when issues or
opportunities arise that requires action. Early warning systems must identify the key
information to be monitored, the criteria necessary to generate the alarm, and the
recipient, frequency and medium of the alarm. To maximize an alarm’s utility, alarms
should be relevant, information rich and not overly repetitive.
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Several Continuous Auditing articles describe the need for audit alarms to sound
when an audit exception occurs. Vasarhelyi and Halper first suggested the alarm concept
in his continuous process auditing system developed for AT&T Bell laboratories internal
audit department.

In this implementation, when the predefined system rules were

violated, alarms were triggered, which were intended to call attention to this system
anomaly. There were four types of alarms: Type 1 alarms were minor alarms that dealt
with the functioning of the audit system; Type 2 alarms were low-level operational
alarms designed for operating management; Type 3 alarms were higher-level exceptions
that were sent directly to the auditor; and Type 4 alarms warned auditors and top
management of a serious crisis (Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991).
In a debt covenants system, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) used alarms sent over
the Internet to notify the lender when the borrower is potentially not in compliance with
its debt covenant agreement. Alles and Brennan used a hierarchical role-based approach
to determine an alarm’s destination. In their implementation, the alarm was always sent
to the auditor. The alarm could also optionally be sent to the responsible enterprise
personnel and/or manager as well as other relevant parties. If the alarm was not resolved
in a timely manner, it was propagated up the organization's hierarchy. In order to prevent
alarm floods, which is when the same alarm is repeatedly sounded, every alarm in the
hierarchy had an enable/disable flag. If the flag is disabled at a point in the hierarchy, the
alarms for all of the nodes below it are also disabled (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006).
Other related research supports the hypothesis that alarms will be a critical part of
a Continuous Auditing system. For example, there is a stream of research on highly
reliable organizations, which avoid catastrophes in spite of the risky and complex
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environment that they operate in. Highly reliable organizations also tend to share five
characteristics, two of which could be fostered by an effective alarm system:
preoccupation with failure and sensitivity to operations. These organizations tend to
encourage reporting of errors so that they can learn from them. They try to identify and
respond to errors in the earliest stage, where there is often only a vague sign of trouble.
Sensitivity to operations describes a highly reliable organizations’ constant
concern with unexpected variability in their business processes. Unexpected variability
can stem from latent failures in a business process’s controls. If latent failures are left
uncorrected, they tend to continue and become more frequent and severe as time
progresses. Many times, they are only detected after a material breakdown has occurred,
but this need not be the case. Highly reliable organizations tend to continually and
carefully monitor their normal operations to detect the onset of latent failures.
Identifying and addressing latent failures in the earliest stages prevents them from
deteriorating to the point of manifesting into catastrophic failures (Weick 2001).

4.5 Black Box Log
A black box audit log is a confidential log of all of an organization’s germane audit
procedures and other economic events. It creates a permanent and non-updatable record
of the most important audit procedures with an audit trail of its own that is kept private
and secure. The benefits of a black box audit log are it would allow a tertiary monitor to
perform peer review audit on the organization, a clear record of accounting and audit
decisions and assist in determining accountability for a financial collapse of an
organization. It is designed to enhance the integrity of audit data by enforcing standard
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control principles such as adequate record maintenance, separation of duties and proper
authorization of audit activities (Alles 2003).
Generally, black box audit logs will rely on a database management system to
track the requisite transaction log, supporting documents and revision history of the
aforementioned.

There are several approaches to making the database management

systems non-updatable. At the hardware level, EMC, IBM and NetApps sell off the shelf
magnetic, optical and tape drives that are based on Write Once and Read Many
(WORM) technology (Pavlou 2011). These drives prevent the data from being modified
once it is written. However, (Hsu 2004) asserts that worm drives can be tampered with if
the drive’s metadata is not also protected. They define a fossilization process, which is a
holistic process to managing data that ensures that it is trustworthy (i.e., has not been
tampered with). The three-step fossilization process is (1) ensure that all the data and
associated metadata are reliably stored and protected from modification; (2) ensure that
the preserved data can be quickly discovered and retrieved; (3) ensure that the preserve
data are delivered in an intact form. They also advanced five principles for implementing
the fossilization process:
1. Raise the barrier to attack.
2. Focus on end-to-end trust.
3. Limit what must be trusted.
4. Use simple and well-defined interfaces between trusted and untrusted
components.
5. Verify all operations.
There are also software solutions to prevent data tampering: (1) Cryptographic
hash, which for an arbitrary block of data calculates an unique digital signature that
would change if the underlying data modified (Bakhtiari 1995); (2) Fragile watermarking,
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which is a watermark that is readily destroyed when the underlying data is modified
(Alomari 2004). These techniques could be applied at the software level to ensure the
data has not been tampered with.
Another approach is to make the black box audit logs read-only, encrypted and
under the supervision of a third party (Alles 2003). Pavlou suggests that a Cloud Service
Provider maybe the ideal location to store the black box audit log (Pavlou 2011). Other
things being equal, storing the black box audit log in the cloud would make it more
difficult for the employees of the organization that own the data to tamper with it, if only
because the exact physical location of the data is likely unknown to the employees of the
organization.

Also, the Cloud maybe more scalable and distributed than the

organization’s internal computing environment, which may provide a cost-effective and
reliable means to store the large volumes of data that will be in most black box audit logs.
However, storing highly sensitive information in the cloud may cause security and
privacy concerns. Also, it remains an open regulatory question to what extent the cloud
service provider and the organization that uses these services are responsible and legally
liable for ensuring proper security measures are in place to safeguard this data (Kaufman
2009).
Finally, some have suggested that a blockchain, which is the distributed ledger
that empowers bitcoin, could make a secure, decentralized and distributed corporate
ledger. Once a transaction is published to the blockchain and confirmed as accurate, it
cannot be reversed, altered or destroyed. Miners, for a small fee, continually ensure the
security of the network and confirm the legitimacy of transactions passing through the
blockchain.

Moreover, blockchain transactions are pure peer-to-peer transactions.
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Therefore, there is no intermediary involved nor third party trust concerns (Lazanis
2015).

4.6 Control Tags
Physical control tags (e.g., bar code readers and RFID tags) enable tracking and physical
validation of audit objects.

For example, control tags could log the passage of an

inventory item through key control points in the business process (e.g., tracking an
inventory item from the warehouse to the shipping company to its ultimate destination at
a retail outlet).

Control tags can be used to provide a continuous stream of audit

information that can monitor the progression of physical objects through an
organization's business process (Vasarhelyi 2004).
Similarly, data control tags use XML to append control information about the
transaction. There are four unique types of data control tags:
1. Reliability Tags: tags that provide an ongoing reliability assessment of the
control process that generated the transaction.
2. Tracer Tags: cookie crumbs tags that uniquely define a transaction, which
are deposited in tracer receptacles at key processing points along the
transaction’s path.
3. Path Recording Tags: tags that are appended to the original transaction
and record the key processing points that acted on it.
4. Information Control Tags: tags that contain other control information such
as organizational placement, name of assurer, and related transactions.
A transaction can be simultaneously tagged with multiple types of the aforementioned
control tags (Vasarhelyi 2005).
Nanosensors could be the next generation of control tags. They are extremely
small devices, which can be used to detect optical, spatial, and chemical information.
Nanosensors can also communicate using wireless networks and could be deployed in
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clustered grids.

For example, Nanosensors could be programmed to create smart

packaging that detects microbes, toxins, and contaminants throughout the food processing
chain, authenticate and track products, which prevents counterfeiting and diversion of
products destined for a specific market, and monitor key environmental factors such as
temperature and humidity (Bowles and Lu 2014).

4.7 Dashboard Reporting
Dashboard reporting is an extension of the Decision Support Systems (DSS) and
Executive Information Support research of the early 1990s. In 1989, Howard Dresner of
the Gartner Group described dashboard reporting as a set of concepts and methods to
improve business decision making using fact-based support systems (Power 2007).
Essentially, dashboard reporting uses corporate databases to assess key performance
indicators, compare key performance indicators to their metrics and perform trend
analysis (e.g., sales for a line of business across years).

Customized dashboards

synthesizing deeper and more detailed operational, financial and marketing information
could be a very valuable corporate asset. However, these dashboards require a defined
structure, and rules to determine what data gets highlighted and escalation (Dewhurst and
Willmott 2014).
These activities are very similar to the monitoring aspect of Continuous Auditing.
The challenges of building a Dashboard report are similar to those encountered in
building the Continuous Auditing system. For example both systems require complete,
accurate and timely data at the right degree of granularity, which is most likely
aggregated from multiple different systems (Warren 2003).
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One example of a decision support system was implemented by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to assess its Accounts Payable (AP) control
framework. The system compared cost, quality and time-based performance measures
for each AP office. For example, labor cost for accounts payable, the average number of
errors per invoice and the average number of days to pay an invoice were calculated by
extracting information for RCMP’s ERP and Human Resource systems and compared
across offices. Using these data analysis techniques the audit team uncovered control
weaknesses and several instances of noncompliance with RCMP’s policy (Coderre 2006).

4.8 Digital Agents
In the context of Continuous Auditing, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) define a Digital
Agent as software that acts on behalf of the auditor in a semi-autonomous manner to
perform a service related to the subject matter being audited.

Woodroof used an

intelligent agent to continuously assure debt covenant compliance. This intelligent agent
continuously extracts accounting information from the borrower’s accounting system and
compares it to the terms of its covenant agreement. Potential violations in the covenant
agreement were flagged for auditors review.
CICA suggests that digital agents can be designed to remotely test transactions
and controls on a continuous basis (CICA/AICPA 1999) However, (Debreceny and Gray
2001) state that financial information on the web may be difficult for digital agents to
effectively use because of resource discovery (i.e., locating the financial statement on the
web) and attribute identification (i.e., finding the appropriate financial statement line
within the financial statement).
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4.9 Extensible Business Reporting Language
EXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) is an open data standard for electronic
financial reporting that fosters greater transparency into financial statements. Using
XBRL, organizations can capture financial information at any point in the business cycle
(Coderre 2009). XBRL has the ability to tag each element on a financial statement or
report with descriptive information, which facilitates the comparison of financial
information between organizations. XBRL promises to improve accuracy of financial
data, hasten its availability to capital markets, reduce the cost of providing financial data,
facilitate paperless financial reporting, and provide more granular and comprehensive
information (2009).

Moreover, XBRL will reduce the need to rekey and reformat

financial data when preparing financial documentation such as printed financial
statements, HTML documents for the organization's website or an electronic EDGAR
filing (Zarowin and Harding 2000).
One example of the analytic power of XBRL is FRAANK, an intelligent audit
agent that converts an organization’s quarterly and annual financial reports into a XBRL
format and retrieves this organization's most recent stock price and earnings per share.
FRAANK uses this financial information to calculate various accounting ratios and Zscore, which is a measure of bankruptcy risk. Consequently FRAANK reduces the
complexity, cost and latency of converting financial information into a computer
understandable format (Bovee, Kogan et al. 2005). Debreceny and Gray postulate that
XBRL could be expanded to accommodate other types of financial reporting and
speculates on an implementation time frame (Debreceny and Gray 2001). Vasarhelyi and
Greenstein envision that XBRL will enable consolidation of distinct entities that
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comprise a value chain, thereby facilitating end-to-end inter-organizational and value
chain analysis (Vasarhelyi and Greenstein 2003).

This would enable corporate

stakeholders to understand the economics of the whole value chain and the effects of a
particular event or trend on it.
Since the SEC mandated XBRL for regulatory filings, XBRL most likely will
become the de facto standard in financial reporting. In 2009, organizations with a public
float greater than $5 billion began using XBRL for their financial reporting. As of June
15, 2011, all publicly traded companies were required to use XBRL for their financial
reporting (Aguilar 2008).

4.10 Workflow
A workflow is an orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by
systematic processes (Ko, Lee et al. 2009). There have not been a lot of research articles
focusing on the workflow within the context of Continuous Auditing.

However,

workflow is used in commercial Continuous Auditing packages and intuitively seems to
be a critical component for a Continuous Auditing system. For example, when a unique
audit exception is identified either from an alarm or by some other means, a formal
workflow process could be defined to ensure the audit exception gets resolved in a timely
manner. At a minimum, a description of the audit exception the owner is responsible for
resolving, a remediation plan, and a due date should be open for each audit exception.
The remediation plan should be approved by the appropriate level of management, who
will use this workflow module to monitor the audit exception’s progress through the
remediation process.
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4.11 Third Party Solutions
Currently, there are several third-party Continuous Auditing software packages. ACL,
Approva, CaseWare IDEA, MetricStream, Oversight Technologies and Trintech are a
few examples of commercial Continuous Auditing systems. All of these products have
predefined analytical methods

for

analyzing

financial transactions,

workflow

management tools, sample business process control frameworks and ERP integration for
extracting financial data.

Approva, MetricStream and Trintech also include robust

dashboard reporting and sample risk management control frameworks (Kuhn Jr and
Sutton 2010).
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the research model that was developed based on factors identified
in the literature review. This research model is both confirmatory and exploratory
research. The research model is confirmatory because it builds on prior research to
investigate whether the various proposed factors are useful in explaining relationships
posited in the Continuous Monitoring domain space. However, this research model at its
core is exploratory.

It seeks to understand what are the most potentially fruitful

Enterprise Risks and architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring
implementation that would be used by management to monitor Enterprise Risks.

5.2 Confirmatory Research
Growing out of an extensive literature review related to Continuous Auditing the
following two factors that may influence one’s opinion on the usefulness of Continuous
Monitoring were investigated:
RQ1: What individual and organizational characteristics are related to the
likelihood of favorable opinions toward the adoption of Continuous Monitoring?
H1: Employees of large auditing firms will be more resistant to
Continuous Monitoring than the general population. Research has
indicated that a group’s resistance to a new system will increase if they
perceive that it could reduce their power (Markus 1983). Continuous
Monitoring systems could jeopardize the big four accounting companies’
traditional business model.
H2: Continuous Monitoring is more likely viewed favorably in companies
with larger total revenue. Research has indicated that a high-level of
investment is a key prerequisite to successful Continuous Monitoring
implementations (Fedorowicz 2008).

80

5.3 Exploratory Research
Ultimately, this research model seeks to understand what is the most potentially fruitful
domain space and technical architecture for an Enterprise Continuous Monitoring
implementation.

By using qualitative methods, this research strives to gain expert

consensus on the ideal Enterprise Risks and technical architecture. This complex and
contextual decision-making process lends itself to qualitative research, which seeks to
drive to consensus among an expert panel. Specific research questions include:
•

•

•

RQ2: Which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to Continuous
Monitoring?
RQ3: Which Continuous Monitoring architectural components are
perceived as most applicable to which types of Enterprise risks?
RQ4: How does participation in an online Delphi process change the
initial viewpoints of the participants?
5.4 Methodology

The research methodology was a snowballing Collaborating Design Delphi research
study targeting professionals with experience in risk management, accounting, and/or
Information Systems. The traditional Delphi method is a structured, anonymous and
multi-round survey process, where expert opinion is aggregated and disseminated to
participants in subsequent rounds (Linstone 1975). In Round one, a questionnaire was
anonymously posed. In subsequent rounds, the results from the previous round were
aggregated and presented to the expert panel, which had the opportunity to revise their
original answers in light of this new information. Snowballing allowed the expert panel
to suggest other experts to participate in the research study. The researcher reviewed the
qualifications of the suggested additions to the expert panel. When they were consistent
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with the desired profile of the research study, the researcher asked permission to use the
name of the recommender in the invitation to the research study.
The Delphi research method is well suited for this research problem. The Delphi
research method is designed to drive convergence between conflicting views. Moreover,
the Delphi research method has a long history of being used for long-range technology
predictions (Gordon and Helmer 1964). Expert opinions have proven to be the best and,
in some cases, the only source of available information, for forecasts in highly volatile
and uncertain domain spaces like this one (Linstone 1975; Linstone and Turoff 2011) .
Finally in general, this method overcomes the halo and bandwagon decision traps (Rowe,
Wright et al. 1991) and produces more accurate forecasts than individuals on the average
(Parenté, Anderson et al. 1984).
Since Continuous Monitoring is a relatively new and niche concept, snowballing
facilitated soliciting an adequate number of participants with sufficient qualifications to
participate in this research. Moreover, Collaborative Design has proven useful not only
to the Continuous Monitoring domain space, but also other emerging areas of
Information Systems research, where academic researchers have the objective of shaping
practices as opposed to just describing them (Alles, Kogan et al. 2013).

5.5 Participants
In order to select suitable experts for the Delphi panel, the researcher’s personal and
professional networks were scrutinized looking for individuals who have expertise in
either risk management, accounting and/or Information Systems.

The ideal panel

member had at least five years of professional experience and some knowledge of risk
management, Information Systems or auditing.
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Over 200 such individuals were

identified from the researcher’s professional network. These individuals were sent an
email with a link to participate in this research. The researcher also promoted this study
on Linkedin and hired Suvata, which is a target research firm, to attract additional
participants.

The researcher’s dissertation committee had extensive personal and

professional networks that were solicited as well. Moreover, each participant had the
opportunity to invite additional experts to participate during Round 1. The minimally
sufficient sample size for this Delphi was 50 total participants, of which at least 15 were
required to be corporate risk managers.

5.6 Procedures
Questionnaires and procedures were submitted to the NJIT IRB prior to their use. Before
distributing questionnaires, pretests were carried out on a small number of subjects. All
selected participants received an email invitation from the researcher with a hyperlink to
the Round 1 questionnaire. This questionnaire had three sections: 1) A consent form, 2)
Demographic Questions, and 3) Scenario Generation Questions, which allowed the
participants to evaluate the importance of each risk and the feasibility of continuously
monitoring it. All participants that completed this questionnaire were invited via an
email to participate in subsequent rounds.
Round 2 presented three risk scenarios and let participants evaluate the
desirability and feasibility of the proposed measures and opine on how useful Continuous
Monitoring would be to monitoring these risk scenarios. Round 3 presented the key
assumptions collected in Round 2 and allowed participants to change their Round 2
answers in light of these assumptions. Each round lasted approximately one to two
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months.

This research study took approximately 6 months.

The below figure

summarizes the process.
Round 1
Consent Form,
Pre-Survey &
Scenario
Generation

Figure 5.1

Results Posted to
Web Board,
Online Discussion

Round 2 Delphi

Analyze Results

Round 3 Delphi
Post Survey

Summary of research method.

Great care was taken to ensure that this research study would not have any
adverse effects on its participants. Prior to conducting this research study, the researcher,
who is a NJIT Ph.D. student, completed the online training course in the protection of
human subjects offered by the US Department of Health and Human Services. Initial
questions and consent forms were reviewed and edited by his Ph.D. committee.
Moreover, participation in the survey is completely optional and is targeted to working
professionals over the age of 21. Finally, participants could choose to terminate their
involvement in this research study at any time for any reason.
Reasonable safeguards were in place to protect the anonymity of the participants.
Numerical IDs were assigned to participants’ survey results. The numerical ID mapping
to the participant’s name remain strictly confidential. This key as well as all the raw
research data, including the survey responses are stored on the researcher’s password-
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protected and encrypted computer. Participants were informed that the responses might
be summarized and, possibly, disseminated to the professional community. However, the
researcher took special care to prevent responses from being traced back to individual
participants. Only participants that granted explicit permission could have their name
listed in subsequent publications.
Before being distributed to participants all questions were approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB).

All of the IRB suggested modifications were

incorporated. Then, the survey questions were drafted and piloted with several test
participants. The pilot was designed to ensure that questions were understandable and
clear.

5.7 Measurement and Analysis
For Research Question 1, attitudes towards Continuous Monitoring were grouped into
three buckets 1) those who have worked for a Big 4 auditing firm. 2) those that are
currently working for the largest companies in terms of revenue and do not work at a Big
4 auditing firm 3) those that are currently working for the smallest companies. An
ANOVA was used to determine if there is a statistical difference for the perceived
usefulness of a Continuous Monitoring system among these groups.
For Research Question 2, the ideal Enterprise Risk for Continuous Monitoring
techniques would have a continuous stream of analyzable electronic data, have a domain
space that does not overly rely on human judgment nor contain competing objectives,
have a predictive model that is cheap to construct and improves the accuracy, reliability,
and/or timeliness of risk predictions over what is currently available via expert decisionmaking, and be a useful measure to a risk practitioner. The mean and standard deviation
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were calculated for Round 2’s questions.

The second part of each question was

qualitatively analyzed to identify the key assumption themes that were presented in
subsequent rounds of the Delphi. In Round 3, the quantitative and qualitative summary
of each question was provided for each of the Likert scale questions. Specifically the
mean and standard deviation of the first part of each question as well as a summary of the
key assumption themes from the second part were presented.

In light of this new

information, the participants were asked to evaluate the assumptions that underlay
different answers (using a Likert scale and open-ended comments) and then to reevaluate
their answers to the first part of each question (i.e., the Likert scale question) for the same
risk scenarios. The Enterprise Risks were ranked by how much they lend themselves to
Continuous Monitoring techniques. These questions were structured such that risks with
higher aggregate average Likert scores were more amenable to Continuous Monitoring
techniques than those with lower average Likert scores.

To calculate the overall

auspiciousness for using Continuous Monitoring for a specific risk scenario, all of its
Likert- scale questions were averaged together. The Enterprise Risk that on average had
the highest Likert score was deemed the best Enterprise Risk for Continuous Monitoring.
For Research Question 3, participants were asked to identify the architectural
components that would form the basis of a Continuous Monitoring System for a
particular Enterprise Risk. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine whether there
were differences among the usage of architectural components across different Enterprise
Risks. For each Enterprise Risk, participants were asked to suggest other architectural
components that were not listed. These suggestions were qualitatively analyzed to assess
the completeness of the architecture literature review in Chapter 4.
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After the final round, the questions’ means and standard deviations were
compared between Rounds 2 and 3. If the Delphi were driving towards consensus, the
standard deviations would be reduced in Round 3. For Research Question 4, the answers
to the pre-test and post-test Continuous Monitoring perceived business value question
were compared with a t-test to see if the study materially influenced the participant’s
opinions on Continuous Monitoring. Finally, data analysis was performed to determine
whether there were any latent relationships between the demographic information and the
perceived business value of Continuous Monitoring.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH RESULTS

6.1 Round 1
In Round 1, 217 potential participants that were selected from the researcher’s
professional network received an email invitation to participate in this research study.
The Round 1 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com and was open from June 30th
2014 to August 11th 2014. The complete survey is listed in Appendix A.
To promote this research study all potential participants were allowed to
recommend additional participants regardless of whether or not they actually participated
in the research study. Public invitations were also posted on a couple of LinkedIn
groups: Continuous Controls Monitoring and Continuous Audit. Finally Survata, which
is a targeted survey firm, was retained to identify and solicit additional participants.
At the end of Round 1, there were 184 fully completed responses. There were an
additional 65 surveys that were started, but not completed, and two surveys where the
respondents answered, “I don’t know” to every question.

These surveys were

disregarded from all subsequent data analysis. For the completed surveys, respondents
had an average of 13 years of I.T. experience, and six years of risk management and
internal/external audit experience. 29 (16% of total) were C-Level executives (e.g.,
CEOs, CTOs CIOs, etc.), 30 (16% of the total) were senior managers, 72 (39% of the
total) were middle management, and the other 53 (28 % of the total) were either in
another role or not employed. The Table 6.1 has the complete distribution.

88

Table 6.1

Respondent’s Position Distribution
Position
C-Level Executive
Senior Management
Supervisor / Middle Management
Other
Not Employed
Total

Count
29
30
72
34
19
184

%
16%
16%
39%
18%
10%
100%

There were 119 respondents (65% of the total) that identified themselves as male,
63 (34% of the total) respondents that identified themselves as female and 2 respondents
that preferred not to identify their gender. There were 95 respondents, 52% of the total
that completed their bachelor’s degree, 56 respondents (30% of the total) that completed
their master’s degree, and 3 respondents (2% of the total) completed their doctorate. The
Table 6.2 has the complete distribution.
Table 6.2

Respondent’s Education Distribution
Highest Education
High School
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
None of the above
Total

Count
28
95
56
3
2
184

%
15%
52%
30%
2%
1%
100%

Age was pretty evenly distributed between the ages of 21 and 64. 38 (21% of
total) respondents stated they were between 21 and 34 years old, 43 (23% of total) were
between the ages of 35 and 44 years old, 54 (29% of total) were between 45 and 54 years
old, and 42 (23% of total) were between 55 and 64 years old. There were only 7 (4% of
total) respondents between the ages of 65 and 74 years old, and no respondents selected
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“75 years or older” or the “Prefer not to answer” categories. The Table 6.3 has the
complete distribution.
Table 6.3

Respondent’s Age Distribution
Age Group
Count
21-34 years old
38
35-44 years old
43
45-54 years old
54
55-64 years old
42
65-74 years old
7
Total
184

%
21%
23%
29%
23%
4%
100%

The respondents worked in many different industries. 32% of the respondents
selected “Other” for their industry. Moreover, the ten industries listed on the survey each
had three or more respondents. Manufacturing and Banking/Finance had the most entries
with 23 each, which was 12% of the total. Transportation had the fewest respondents
with three. Table 6.4 has the complete distribution. Ten respondents worked at a Big 4
accounting firm, while 174 have not. Overall, the response rate from Big 4 accounting
companies was surprisingly low relative to other industries. Some respondents that
worked for a Big 4 accounting firm commented that their firm had a stated policy
prohibiting participation in unsanctioned accounting research studies.
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Table 6.4

Respondent’s Position Distribution
Industry
Other
Manufacturing
Banking/Finance
Not Currently Employed
Government
Education
Communications
Healthcare
Insurance
Retail
Hospitality
Transportation
Total

Count
%
59
32%
23
12%
23
12%
16
9%
11
6%
10
5%
10
5%
10
5%
9
5%
6
3%
5
3%
3
2%
184 100%

The respondents tended to work in larger companies. “Over a billion”, which was
both the largest revenue category and also the most frequently selected category on the
survey, had 47 respondents (26% of the total). The other five revenue levels all had at
least ten respondents each. 27 respondents (15% of the total) did not know their
company’s revenue size. The Table 6.5 has the complete distribution.
Table 6.5

Respondent’s Company Size Distribution
Company Size
Count
Under $1M
22
Between $1 and $10 Million
23
Between $10 and $100 Million
36
Between $100 and $500 Million
19
Between $500 Million and $1 Billion
10
Over $1 Billion
47
Not sure / Don't know
27
Total
184
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%
12%
13%
20%
10%
5%
26%
15%
100%

6.1.1

Attitudes Towards Continuous Monitoring

Overall, the respondents had a very positive view of Continuous Monitoring. There were
73 respondents (39% of the total) that believed Continuous Monitoring is “Very Likely”
to provide material business value and 83 respondents (44% of the total) believe
Continuous Monitoring is “Likely” to have material business value. Conversely only two
respondents (1% of the total) believed that Continuous Monitoring was unlikely to
provide material business value. Table 6.6 has the complete distribution.
Table 6.6

Respondent’s Belief that Continuous Monitoring Could Add Value
Company Size
Count
%
Very likely
73
40%
Likely
83
45%
Neutral
26
14%
Unlikely
0
0%
Very unlikely
2
1%
Total
184 100%

Questions 14 and 15 determine an Enterprise Risk’s feasibility and desirability
respectively. The “Don’t know” answers were filtered out for both questions and their
feasibility and desirability scores were averaged together. In aggregate, the top three
Enterprise Risks that the participants believed lend themselves to a Continuous
Monitoring system are (1) Computer Crime (2) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk (3)
Damage to Brand and Reputation. The bottom three risks were Legal, Regulatory and
Commodity Price Risk. Table 6.7 has the complete rankings.
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Table 6.7

Average Ranking by Enterprise Risks

Average
Average Ranking by Enterprise
Desirability &
Risks (Lower is better)
Desirable*
Feasible**
Feasibility
Computer Crime
1.83
2.14
1.98
Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk
2.02
2.15
2.08
Damage to brand/reputation
2.05
2.21
2.13
External Business interruption
2.07
2.24
2.15
Surprise Competitive Threats
2.02
2.29
2.16
Economic Volatility
2.10
2.33
2.21
Internal Business interruption
2.09
2.35
2.22
Legal Risks
2.13
2.36
2.24
Regulatory
2.13
2.38
2.26
Commodity Price Risk
2.21
2.37
2.29
*Scale: 1-Very Desirable; 2-Desirable; 3-Possibly **Scale: 1-Very Feasible; 2Desirable; 4-Undesirable; 5-Very Undesirable
Feasible; 3-Possibly Feasible;
4-Unfeasible; 5-Very Unfeasible

6.1.2

RQ1: Adoption Characteristics

Research Question 1 attempts to determine the individual and organizational
characteristics related to favorable opinions about Continuous Monitoring. Based on the
literature review, the size and type of a company were hypothesized to influence the
perception of Continuous Monitoring. Other things being equal, working at a Big 4 audit
firm was hypothesized to lead to a more unfavorable perception of Continuous
Monitoring while working at another large company was hypothesized to lead to a more
favorable perception. Prior research has indicated that Continuous Monitoring systems
could jeopardize the Big four accounting companies’ traditional business model, which
would make them selfishly more cynical of this technology, and that a high-level of
investment required for Continuous Monitoring implementations, would make this
technology more appealing to large companies that can afford it compared to small
companies that could not.
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Question 13 is the dependent variable. It asked, “To what extent do you believe
that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to provide material business value to
today’s companies?” The complete distribution of answer choices was shown above in
Table 6.6. The Likert score scale was
0 – Don’t Know (not used in the analysis).
1 – Very Unlikely
2 – Unlikely
3 – Neutral
4 – Likely
5 - Very Likely
“Don't know” responses were dropped from the mean and standard deviation
calculations, because this analysis focused only on participants that were confident in
their answers, which is standard protocol for this type of analysis. The Ryan-Joiner
normality test confirms that this variable is normally distributed at an α = 0.05 (p=0.10).
However, this question is substantially skewed toward the positive end. Dropping “0Don’t Know” responses from the sample, the sample’s mean is 4.22 and its standard
deviation is 0.77.
The independent variables are Question 10 and Question 11. Question 10 asked,
“Are you employed by PWC, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and/or KPMG?” (i.e.,
the Big 4 Accounting firms). The answer choices were “Yes” and “No”. Question 11
asked, “How large is your current employer in terms of Total Annual Revenue?” The
answer choices were
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Under $1 Million
> $1 Million and <= $10 Million
> $10 Million and <= $100 Million
> $100 Million <= $500 Million
> $500 Million <= $1 Billion
Over $1 Billion
Not sure / Don't know
The “I Don’t know” responses for Questions 11 and 13 were dropped. Table 6.8 shows
the Likert score distribution across these categories.
Table 6.8

RQ1 Distribution by Likert Scale
Very
Unlikely Unlikely Neutral
1
2
3
Big 4
10%
10%
30%
Not Big 4
1%
14%
45%
$1B or more
2%
9%
38%
Under $1B
0%
17%
49%

Likely
4
50%
40%
51%
34%

Very
Likely
5
10%
1%
2%
0%

N

10
157
45
102

The means are in the hypothesized order: Big 4 the lowest (i.e., 4.10) and “1B or more”
the highest (4.36). See the below figure.

Figure 6.1

Mean by Business Case.
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The Point Biserial Correlation Coefficient for revenue size is 0.11, which means
there is a slight positive correlation between revenue size and increased Likert score for
perceived usefulness of Continuous Monitoring.

The Point Biserial Correlation

Coefficient for a Big 4 audit firm is -0.04, which means there is a very small negative
correlation between working at a big audit firm and the perceived usefulness of
Continuous Monitoring. Table 6.9 has the summary statistics for these groups.
Table 6.9

RQ1 Summary Statistics
N
Big 4
10
Not Big 4
147
$1B or more
45
Under $1B
102
All
157

Mean
4.10
4.23
4.36
4.18
4.22

Stdev
1.29
0.74
0.83
0.70
0.78

Even though the means are in the hypothesized order, this result was not
statistically significant. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is a statistical
method that analyzes variations in means among disparate groups, was calculated for the
three groups: 1) “Companies $1 Billion or more in Revenue”, 2) “Companies less than a
3) $1 Billion in revenue”, and “Big 4 Accounting firms”, which by their nature are over
$1 Billion in revenue. The analysis was not significant at an α = 0.05 (p = .39), when
using the single question indicator of attitude toward Continuous Monitoring.
6.1.3

Constructing a Desirability Index

In order to construct an alternative measure of business value, a Factor analysis, which is
a statistical method that examines correlations among observed variables to extract a few
latent variables, was run to create a Desirability index. Question 15 solicited opinions on
how desirable Continuous Monitoring would be for the Enterprise Risks identified in the
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literature review. The following sample set manipulations where made to clean the data
and consolidate categories that had sparse data points:
•

•

•

•

•

Respondents that answered, “I don’t know” to any Desirability or
Feasibility question were dropped from the sample.
Respondents that answered “None of the above” to Question 8 were
dropped because of their small sample sizes. Those that answered
“Doctorate” where grouped into “Masters+.”
Respondents that answered, “Prefer not to answer” to Question 7, which
dealt with Gender, were dropped, because of its small sample size.
Question 9, which was the Industry question, responses that were either
“Retail”, “Hospitality”, or “Transportation” were recoded as “Other”.
Question 5 responses, which captured the amount of Risk Management,
Information Systems, and Audit Experience the respondents had, were
collapsed into the following categories “None”, “<= 5”, “>5 and <= 10”
“>10 and <=20”, “20+” years.

In total, 17 respondents were removed from the sample and 12 answers to Question 9
were recoded as “Other”. Table 6.10 summarizes the resulting distribution.
Table 6.10
Desirability Distribution by Likert Scale
Enterprise Risk
1
2
3
4
5
15.a: Economic Volatility
30%
38%
27%
5%
0%
15.b: Regulatory
31%
35%
27%
5%
1%
15.c: Competitive Threats
37%
37%
20%
5%
1%
15.d: Market
36%
35%
25%
4%
1%
15.e: Reputation
34%
37%
22%
7%
1%
15.f: Legal
37%
26%
28%
8%
1%
15.g: External Interruption
37%
33%
23%
4%
2%
15.h: Internal interruption
32%
38%
22%
5%
2%
15.i: Commodity
28%
37%
27%
7%
1%
15.j: Computer Crime
48%
32%
16%
3%
2%
1-Very Desirable; 2-Desirable; 3-Possibly Desirable; 4-Undesirable; 5-Very Undesirable
The Factor analysis was run on this same sample set of 167 respondents. The one
variable Factor analysis explained 67% of the variance and measures the Desirability of
using Continuous Monitoring across this set of Enterprise Risks. Table 6.11 has the

97

loading factors, which demonstrate a strong correlation with Question 15’s desirability
variables and measures the desirability of using Continuous Monitoring across this set of
Enterprise Risks.
Table 6.11

Loading Factors from Factor Analysis
Variable
Economic Volatility
Regulatory
Competitive Threats
Market
Reputation
Legal
External Interruption
Internal Interruption
Commodity
Computer Crime

Loading
Factors
0.72
0.79
0.84
0.77
0.78
0.85
0.85
0.82
0.85
0.83

This desirability index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95, which means that it is strongly
internally consistent. Its mean is 2.47 and standard deviation is 0.95.
A one way ANOVA was individually run between the demographic variables and
Desirability Index. No variables were significant at α = 0.05. However, Years of Audit
Experience was significant at α = 0.10. Generally speaking, the more years of audit
experience the participant had the more desirable they thought Continuous Monitoring
would be.

Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Years of Risk

Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role, Industry, Gender and Age variables
were not significant at an α = 0.10.
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Table 6.12

Desirability Index ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values
Variable
P-Value
R-Square
Years of Auditing Experience**
0.06
5.34
Education
0.19
2.04
Years of Risk Management Experience
0.22
3.49
Role
0.38
2.56
Age
0.42
2.36
Revenue
0.44
3.55
Industry
0.45
4.75
Years of Information Management Experience
0.51
2.00
Gender
0.87
0.02
Big 4
0.95
0.00
**Signification at α = 0.10

6.1.4

Constructing a Feasibility Index

In order to construct an alternative measure of business value, a Factor analysis was run
on the feasibility variables from Questions 16. Question 16 solicited opinions on how
feasible Continuous Monitoring would be for the Enterprise Risk identified in the
literature review. Table 6.13 summarizes this distribution.
Table6.13
Feasibility Distribution by Likert Scale
Enterprise Risk
1
2
3
4
5
16.a: Economic Volatility
25%
37%
31%
8%
0%
16.b: Regulatory
23%
38%
29%
10%
0%
16.c: Competitive Threats
25%
34%
34%
7%
1%
15.i: Commodity Price
25%
31%
33%
10%
1%
15.j: Computer Crime
32%
30%
34%
4%
0%
15.g: External interruption
27%
23%
41%
8%
1%
15.h: Internal Business
24%
29%
37%
9%
1%
15.f: Legal
24%
28%
35%
11%
1%
15.d: Market
26%
25%
44%
5%
1%
15.e: Reputation
28%
32%
35%
5%
0%
1-Very Feasible; 2-Feasible; 3-Possibly Feasible; 4-Unfeasible; 5-Very Unfeasible
The Factor analysis was run on the same sample set of 167 respondents described
in Subsection 6.1.3. The one variable Factor analysis explained 41% of the variance.
Table 6.14 has its loading factors, which demonstrates a strong correlation with Question
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16’s feasibility variables and measures the feasibility of using Continuous Monitoring
across this set of Enterprise Risks.
Table 6.14

Loading Factors from Factor Analysis
Variable
Economic Volatility
Regulatory
Competitive Threats
Market
Reputation
Legal
External Interruption
Internal Interruption
Commodity Risk
Computer Crime

Loading
Factor
0.63
0.66
0.70
0.55
0.59
0.60
0.66
0.72
0.64
0.61

This feasibility index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84, which implies that it has good
internal consistency. Its mean is 3.55 and standard deviation is 0.95
A one way ANOVA was run between the demographic variables and Feasibility
Index. Years of Audit was significant at α = 0.05 and Years of Risk Management
Experience was significant at α = 0.10. Generally speaking, the more years of audit
and/or risk management experience, the more feasible the participant thought Continuous
Monitoring would be. Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education,
Revenue, Role, Industry, Gender and Age variables were not significant at an α = 0.10.
Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role,
Industry, Gender and Age variables were not significant at an α = 0.10.
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Table 6.15

Feasibility Index ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values
Variable
P-Value
R-Square
Years of Auditing Experience*
0.00
11.61
Years of Risk Management Experience**
0.08
5.04
Education
0.38
1.16
Revenue
0.42
3.64
Big 4
0.46
0.33
Years of Information Management Experience
0.48
2.13
Gender
0.85
0.02
Role
0.90
0.64
Age
0.91
6.10
Industry
0.93
1.88
* Significant at α = 0.05
** Significant at α = 0.10

6.1.5

Exploratory Data Analysis

Round 1’s data was also examined to determine whether there are any latent relationships
that were not explicitly indicated by the literature review. A one way ANOVA was run
on the same sample set of 167 respondents described in Subsection 6.1.3. The ANOVA
individually compared demographic variables and Question 13 that measures business
value. Question 13 is “To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the
potential to provide material business value to today’s companies?” Years of Auditing
Experience and Years of Risk Management Experience were significant at α = 0.05. Big
4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role, Industry,
Gender and Age variables were not significant at an α = 0.10.
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Table 6.16

Perceived Business Value ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values
Variable
P-Value
R-Square
Years of Auditing Experience*
0.01
8.27
Years of Risk Management Experience*
0.02
6.72
Big 4
0.15
1.24
Years of Information Management Experience
0.17
3.88
Education
0.69
0.45
Revenue
0.75
2.12
Role
0.88
0.72
Industry
0.89
2.22
Gender
0.96
0.00
Age
0.98
0.24
* Significant at α = 0.05
For both Risk Management and Auditing, having more than five years of

experience seems to affect the perceived business value for Continuous Monitoring.
Participants that had less than five years’ experience in these respective areas tended to
have worse perception of Continuous Monitoring value proposition than their more
experienced counterparts did. For Risk Management five to ten years of experience had
the highest perceived value of Continuous Monitoring. The perception decreases in the
ten to 20 year range, and fell again in the 20+ year range. Similarly, for Auditing, the
five to ten years of experience had the highest perceived value of Continuous Monitoring
and the perception dipped slightly with ten to 20 years of experience. However, for
auditing, 20+ years of experience had the highest perceived business value (see below
table).
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Table 6.17

Mean Perceived Business Value by Years of Experience
Risk Management
Auditing
Average
Average
Business
Business
Years of
Value
Value
Experience
Likert
Count
Likert
Count
None
2.0
57
1.9
57
<=5
1.8
42
1.9
53
>5 & <=10
1.5
36
1.5
33
>10 & <=20
1.6
26
1.6
15
20+
1.8
6
1.3
9
Total
1.8
167
1.8
167
Scale:1-Very Likely, 2-Likely, 3-Neutral, 4-Unlikely, 5-Very Unlikely

Performing a t-test on these variables when they are bisected into two groups:
“less than or equal to five years of experience” and “greater than five years of
experience”, yields significant results at α = 0.05

For Risk Management and Auditing

experience, the t-test yields a p-value = .00. This implies that having more experience in
either Risk Management and/or Auditing significantly affects the perceived business
value of Continuous Monitoring. It appears that the more experience in these areas, the
higher the perceived value of Continuous Monitoring.
6.1.6

Differences between Solicitation Methods

There were two methods used to solicit participants: 1) the researcher’s professional
network and 2) Survata, which is a targeted research firm. For Round 1 there were 150
participants in the Survata pool and 17 participants in the researcher’s pool. They were
compared along several dimensions to determine whether there were statistical
differences between the solicitation methods. Specifically, these pools were compared
using a one-way ANOVA along the following dimensions: perceived value of
Continuous Monitoring (Question 13), company revenue size (Question 11), role
(Question 12) and education (Question 8).
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See Appendix A for exact questions.

Between the pools, education was the only dimension with a statistical difference at an α
= 0.05 (see below table).
Table 6.18

Mean Business Value by years of Risk Management and Audit Experience
Researcher
Survata
Question #: Variable
Mean
Mean
P
Q8: Education*
2.14
2.59
0.01
Q11: Company Revenue
3.26
3.12
0.80
Q12: Role
1.19
1.18
0.95
Q13: Perceived Business Value Proposition
1.59
1.77
0.33
* Significant at α = 0.05

Table 6.19 contains the Likert score to answer choice mapping by question.
Table 6.19 Likert score to Answer Choice Mapping
Likert
Question 8
Question 11
Question 12
Value
Education
Revenue
Role
0 None of the above
Not sure
Not Employed / Other
1
High School
Under $1M
Middle Manger
2
Bachelors
$1 - $10 Mil
Senior Manager
3
Masters+
$10 - $100 Mil
Executive
4
$100 - $500 Mil
5
$500 Mil - $1 Bil
6
Over $1 Bil
6.1.7

Question 13
Value Prop
Very likely
Likely
Neutral
Unlikely
Very unlikely

Building Round 2’s Scenarios

Question 16 was qualitatively analyzed for potential scenarios for Round 2.

The

following Enterprise Risk Taxonomy was used
•

•

Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another major financial crisis (e.g.,
Mortgage default) and/or downturn. Recent examples include weakness in
the Eurozone, projected slowed economic growth forecast in India and
China, persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated worldwide
unemployment rate, reoccurring financial crisis, failure of major countries
to pay their debt.
Regulatory pressure and/or changes in regulatory environment: Basel III,
SOX, Dodd-Frank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices legislation, local
privacy, investigation by government agency or regulatory body & laws
and the International Financial Reporting Standards, Health Care reforms.
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•

•

•

•
•

•

•

•

Surprise Competitive Threats: New and, perhaps better, competitors
and/or products in the marketplace change in consumer trends and
technological advancements (i.e., product obsolesces), increased global
competitive pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such as price wars),
mergers and acquisitions.
Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk: The risk that borrows will default on
their commitments. The risk that an investor will experience losses as
result of participating in financial markets. The risk of loss resulting from
being unable to trade a security or asset quickly.
Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls, regulatory challenges (e.g.,
JP Morgan Chase), involvement in a corporate or personal scandal (e.g.,
Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or product (e.g., Blackberry),
unable to meet demand for successful product, being flamed on social
media.
Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits.
External Business interruption: Infrastructure failures (e.g., electricity and
telecommunication network failures), financial market failures (closing of
key markets), loss of computer infrastructure, transportation strikes,
criminal attacks, or embargos.
Internal Business interruption: For example strike or slowdown, accidents,
fraud, workplace violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear power plant
explosion of materials or fires).
Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas, shortages that lead to price
run-ups.
Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus and malicious code,
proprietary or customer information can be stolen via hacking or internal
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards); malicious software can disrupt
operations of essential services such as security, defense, power plants, as
well as banking, commerce, etc.

The qualitative analysis revealed that 58 respondents did not provide business
scenarios. The computer crime category had the largest number of suggested scenarios.
32 respondents suggested a specific Computer Crime scenario (e.g., hacking, IP theft,
etc.) as the most auspicious area for a Continuous Monitoring system. Most suggested
scenarios dealing with protecting customer and credit card data from hackers. Both the
2014 Target and 2012 Sony intrusions were suggested as possible scenarios. Other more
novel suggestions included preventing a terrorist group from infiltrating a highly valuable
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security defense area such as a nuclear power plant, detecting phishing schemes on social
media sites and monitoring employee access patterns to prevent data theft.
Several suggested more traditional Continuous Monitoring Scenarios in the areas
of Operations, Fraud Detection and Compliance, which is where Continuous Monitoring
has been routinely used for some time now. Some example scenarios include monitoring
for operational processes for failure, fraud, audit exceptions, business interruptions and
long tailed risk. However, there were also some novel suggestions. Two respondents
suggested using Continuous Monitoring to monitor social media to detect potential
reputational risks and/or looming public relations crises.

Another two respondents

suggested using Continuous Monitoring to monitor the speed of operational and
production processes.

Finally, another two respondents suggested using Continuous

Monitoring in the health care field. One suggested monitoring medical records for
potential early warning signs of a serious medical condition. The other suggested using
Continuous Monitoring to ensure a hospital’s compliance with governmental mandates
around health care. These novel scenarios could be the basis of future research in
Continuous Monitoring. Table 6.20 has the complete distribution.
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Table 6.20

Qualitative Categorization of Scenario Generation Question
Category

N

No Scenario Provided
Computer Crime

*

**

Operations
Other

*

Economic Volatility

**

Internal Fraud/Thief

%

58

31.52%

32

17.39%

24

13.04%

20

10.87%

15

8.15%

11

5.98%

External Business interruption

*

8

4.35%

*

7

3.80%

3

1.63%

2

1.09%

1

0.54%

1

0.54%

1

0.54%

1

0.54%

Surprise Competitive Threats
*

Regulatory

*

Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk
Legal Risks

*
*

Damage to brand/reputation
**

Compliance

*

Internal Business interruption
*

Commodity Price Risk
Total

0
0%
184 100.00%

Enterprise Risks*
Traditional Continuous Monitoring Risk**
Computer Crime, Economic Volatility, and Surprise Competitive Threat were
chosen to be studied in Round 2. The Harvard Business Case repository was searched for
representative business cases that fit these Enterprise Risks. After a thorough review, the
following cases were selected: Sony’s 2012 Cyber Intrusion for Computer Crime, Bear
Stearns’ Implosion for Market Risk, and RIM’s loss of Competitive Advantage for
Damage to brand and/or reputation. These cases were summarized and presented in
Round 2. These Business Cases are listed in Appendix B.
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6.2 Round 2
The 188 respondents that completed Round 1 were sent an email invitation to the Round
2 survey. The Round 2 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com and was open from
September 29, 2014 to November 10, 2014. Round 2 had 81 respondents that completed
the entire survey. The dropout rate between Round 1 and Round 2 was 57%. Round 2
presented examples of the top three Enterprise Risks identified in Round 1. The Sony
scenario dealt with computer crime. The Bear Stearns scenario dealt with operational
risk. The RIM scenario dealt with strategic risk.

The complete survey is listed in

Appendix B.
6.2.1

RQ2: Auspicious Enterprise Risks

Research Question 2 seeks to determine which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to
Continuous Monitoring. Likert-type questions were constructed to measure the detailed
factors that could lead to a successful Continuous Monitoring system. Six factors were
identified based upon the literature review:
1. Cost of human judgment,
2. Cost of building a predictive model,
3. Availability of digital data,
4. Proficiency of human judgment to detect risk,
5. The probability a predictive model can be built and,
6. The performance of the best predictive model compared to expert human
judgment.
The Likert scale was constructed such that a higher Likert score on a question indicated a
more advantageous scenario for Continuous Monitoring. The same Likert questions were
asked for all three business scenarios. Table 6.21 has the Likert Scale for each question.
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Table 6.21

Likert Scale by Question
0
1
2
3
4
5
No
Judgment / Extremely Relatively
Moderately Prohibitive
Cost
Reasonable
I don’t
cheap
cheap
expensive expensive
Human
know
Judgment
No
Cost
Prohibitive Moderately
Relatively Extremely
Reasonable
Predictive Judgment / I
Expensive expensive
cheap
cheap
Model don’t know
None or
About half
Some of the
Most of the All the
very little of
of the
No
relevant
relevant
relevant
the data
relevant
Judgment / I
data is
data is
data is
needed is in
data is
don’t know
available
available
available
a digital
available
Digital
digitally
digitally
digitally
form
digitally
Data
No
Human
Definitely Possibly
Possibly Definitely
Feasible
Judgment Judgment / I
Infeasible Infeasible
Feasible
Feasible
Detect Risk don’t know
No
Predictive
Definitely Possibly
Possibly Definitely
Feasible
Model Can Judgment / I
Feasible
Feasible
Infeasible Infeasible
be Built don’t know
Moderately
Moderately
Far inferior
Far superior
inferior in
superior in
in terms of
in terms of
terms of
terms of
accuracy,
accuracy,
No
accuracy,
accuracy,
About the
consistency
consistency
Judgment / I
consistency
consistency
and/or
same
and/or
and/or
and/or
Predictive don’t know
timeliness
timeliness
timeliness
timeliness
Model
of
of
of
of
compared
predictions
predictions
predictions
predictions
to Human
Higher scores are more advantageous to Continuous Monitoring

The following six tables present the detailed results for these questions for the three
scenarios.
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Table 6.22
Sony
Bear Stearns
Blackberry
Total

Digital Data Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
0%
7%
15%
7%

25%
39%
26%
30%

16%
11%
9%
13%

44%
38%
34%
39%

5
15%
5%
15%
12%

Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
237
13
180
20
163
28
580
61

Table 6.23

Cost Human Judgment Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
5
Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
Sony
0%
7%
39%
40%
13%
241
14
Bear Stearns
3%
7%
39%
44%
7%
203
22
Blackberry
2%
15%
49%
26%
8%
171
28
Total
2%
9%
42%
37%
9%
615
64

Table 6.24

Cost Predictive Model Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
5
Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
Sony
7%
59%
30%
4%
0%
164
10
Bear Stearns
9%
42%
39%
8%
2%
165
15
Blackberry
13%
30%
41%
13%
4%
143
27
Total
9%
45%
36%
8%
2%
472
52

Table 6.25

Human Judgment Detect Risk Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
5
Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
Sony
7%
27%
39%
21%
6%
207
10
Bear Stearns
14%
22%
28%
25%
12%
195
16
Blackberry
15%
27%
28%
23%
7%
168
21
Total
12%
25%
32%
23%
8%
570
47

Table 6.26

Predictive Model Can be Built Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
5
Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
Sony
1%
12%
28%
46%
13%
243
13
Bear Stearns
8%
23%
28%
27%
14%
202
17
Blackberry
13%
20%
22%
33%
11%
167
27
Total
7%
18%
26%
35%
13%
612
57
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Table 6.27

Model compared to Human Judgment Distribution by Likert Scale
1
2
3
4
5
Total
# of No
Vote Judgments
Sony
3%
10%
24%
49%
14%
253
11
Bear Stearns
8%
11%
32%
33%
16%
213
18
Blackberry
14%
21%
32%
23%
9%
163
25
Total
8%
14%
29%
36%
13%
629
54
The “Ryan-Joiner” Normality Test concluded that the variables are normally

distributed at an α = 0.05 (p=0.07). In aggregate, the results of Round 2 mirrored Round
1. Averaging each case’s six question Likert score, respondents in Round 2 ranked Sony
as the most advantageous Continuous Monitoring scenario with a mean Likert score of
3.24 out of 5, which was followed by Bear Stearns with a mean Likert score of 3.06 out
of 5, while RIM was viewed as the least advantageous scenario with a mean Likert score
of 2.95 out of 5 (see below table).
Table 6.28

Mean Likert Scaled Values by Question

Bear
Factors
Sony
Stearns
RIM
Cost Human Judgment
3.60
3.44
3.23
Cost Predictive Model
2.31
2.50
2.65
Digital Data
3.49
2.95
3.08
Human Judgment Detect Risk
2.92
3.00
2.80
Predictive Model Can be Built
3.57
3.16
3.09
Predictive Model compared to Human
3.61
3.38
2.91
Mean Likert Score
3.24
3.06
2.95
“No Judgment” responses were excluded from mean calculations

Total
3.44
2.47
3.19
2.91
3.29
3.33
3.10

A one-way ANOVA was calculated between the three scenarios across all six
factors.

The variance between scenarios was significant at an α = 0.05 (p = .00).

Therefore, participants viewed some scenarios as more advantageous to Continuous
Monitoring than other scenarios. Specifically, the Sony scenario that dealt with risk of
computer crime was viewed as a more promising Continuous Monitoring endeavor than
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the operational and strategic risks illustrated by the Bear Stearns and RIM scenario
respectively. This ranking is consistent with the ranking identified in Round 1 (see
Subsection 6.1.7).
6.2.2

RQ3: Requisite Architectural Components

Research Question 3 seeks to determine the requisite Continuous Monitoring
architectural components and determine the ones that are most applicable to an Enterprise
Risk. In questions 9, 16 and 23 of Round 2 participants were asked to select all the
components that they believed would be in a Continuous Monitoring system for the Sony,
Bear Stern, and RIM scenarios respectively. Generally speaking, the participants were
roughly evenly divided on whether or not a component was needed for each scenario.
Table 6.29 summarizes the percentage of participants that selected each component
across the three scenarios.
Table 6.29

Percentage of Participants that stated a Component was Needed
Analytical Dashboard
Data
Digital
Functions
Reporting
Warehouse Agents Workflow
Bear Stearns
49%
53%
54%
49%
43%
RIM
58%
47%
46%
42%
32%
Sony
48%
49%
52%
63%
49%

A Kruskal-Wallis test was run on the five components; Analytic Functions, Dashboard
Reporting, Data Warehouse, and Digital Agents and Workflows, which were described in
Chapter 4. This test indicated that Digital Agents and Workflows were used differently
across the three business scenarios. Moreover, there was no usage difference among the
other three components (i.e., Analytical Functions, Dashboard Reporting and Data
Warehouse) at an α = 0.05. See the below table.
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Table 6.30

Mean Likert Scaled Value by Question

Bear
P-Val
Sony
Stearns
RIM
Adjusted
Component
Median Median Median for ties
Digital Agents*
1
0
0
0.03
Workflows**
0
0
0
0.08
Analytical Functions
0
0
1
0.39
Data Warehouse
1
1
0
0.53
Dashboard Reporting
0
1
0
0.73
Scale 1 = Use the Component, 0 = Don’t use the Component
* Significant at α = 0.05
** Significant at α = 0.10
Participants were also asked to suggest other potential architectural components

for each business scenario. A qualitative review of their responses uncovered no new
architectural components, which offers strong evidence that the literature review
identified the main architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring system.

6.3 Round 3
Research Question 4 measures how participation in this research study changes the initial
viewpoints of the participants. The Round 3 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com
and was open from January 24, 2015 to February 7, 2015. Round 3 had 59 respondents
that completed the entire survey. The between round dropout rate was 27%. The
complete set of questions is listed in Appendix C. On balance participants feel they
obtained useful information from this research study (i.e., the mean Likert score for
Question 21 was 2.6); this was a high quality research study (i.e., the mean Likert score
for Question 24 was 4.2); and its results have the potential to be important (i.e., the mean
Likert score for Question 22 was 2.7)
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6.3.1

RQ4: Research Study Changes Viewpoints

Research Question 4 measures how participation in this research study changes the initial
viewpoints of the participants. In Round 1 and 3, the participants were asked, “To what
extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to provide material
business value to today’s companies?” The Likert score scale was
5 - Very Likely
4 – Likely
3 – Neutral
2 – Unlikely
1 – Very Unlikely
Table 6.31 has the distribution of responses to these questions. Those that answered, “I
don’t know” were excluded from this analysis.
Table 6.31

Continuous Monitoring Value Proposition Distribution Round 1 and 3
Round 1
Round 3
#
%
#
%
Responses
Very likely
73
40%
17
29%
Likely
83
45%
34
58%
Neutral
26
14%
4
7%
Unlikely
0
0%
3
5%
Very unlikely
2
1%
1
2%
Total
184 100%
59 100%

For this question, the mean Likert response in Round 1 was 4.22 and in Round 3 it
was 4.07. Therefore, the perceived business value of Continuous Monitoring dropped
slightly between Rounds 1 and 3. One possible explanation for this decrease is that as
participants pondered the complexities of a Continuous Monitoring system within the
context of a specific business case, the implementation complexities caused their
optimism to dip.
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The Ryan-Joiner normality had a p-value of 0.01, which implies that this variable
was not normally distributed at α = 0.05. As a result, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to
determine if this question’s decrease between Round 1 and Round 3 was significant. The
resulting p-value was 0.30. Therefore, this decrease was not significant at an α = 0.10,
which implies that participating in this study did not significantly affect participant’s
perceptions of Continuous Monitoring’s business value.
In Round 2 there was a non-trivial amount of standard deviation, which represents
disagreement between the respondents about the viability of Continuous Monitoring. In
an attempt to drive consensus among participants, Round 2’s assumptions questions (see
Questions 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21 and 22 in Appendix B) were qualitatively
analyzed and the most frequently listed assumptions were voted on in Round 3 (see
Questions 3, 9 and 15 in Appendix C for a complete lists of assumptions). Every
question in Round 3 had a lower standard deviation than the corresponding question in
Round 2.
Table 6.32

Standard Deviation by Question between Rounds
Question
Case
Cost Human Judgment
Bear Stearns
RIM
Sony
Cost Predictive Model
Bear Stearns
RIM
Sony
Predictive Model Can be Built
Bear Stearns
RIM
Sony
Model Compared to Human Judgment
Bear Stearns
RIM
Sony
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Round 2
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.2
1.5
1.0
1.7
1.8
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.5

Round 3
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.2
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.4
1.2

Since a Ryan-Joiner normality test implied that the these questions were generally
not normally distributed at α = 0.05, a Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to compare Round 1
and Round 3 results. Bear Stearns and Sony’s “Cost of Human Judgment” question, RIM
and Sony’s “Cost of Predictive Model” question, and RIM’s “Predictive Model Can be
Built” question and “Predictive Model Compared to Human Judgment” question all had
significant changes between Rounds 2 and 3. See below table.
Table 6.33

Median by Question between Rounds

Question
Cost Human Judgment
Cost Predictive Model
Predictive Model Can be Built
Model Compared to Human Judgment
* Significant at α = 0.05
** Significant at α = 0.10

Case
Bear Stearns*
RIM
Sony*
Bear Stearns
RIM**
Sony**
Bear Stearns
RIM*
Sony
Bear Stearns
RIM**
Sony

Median Median
Round 2 Round 3
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
4
4

PValue
0.03
0.75
0.00
0.31
0.02
0.07
0.58
0.07
0.36
0.11
0.02
0.72

In conclusion the Delphi appears to have driven consensus between participants
as evidenced by the lower standard deviation between rounds. However another possible
explanation for the decrease in standard deviation is that 22 participants dropped out of
the research experiment between Rounds 1 and 2.

Perhaps, the participants that

completed Round 3 were more likeminded than those who dropped out.
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6.4 Limitations
This research study suffers from the limitations of all self-reported studies. Specifically,
respondents may provide answers that they believe the researcher wants to hear, forget
pertinent details, provide exaggerated or incorrect answers, and/or may not reveal overly
private information.

Moreover, participants may have various biases, perception

limitations and/or gaps in their understanding that skew their answers. In this research
study many questions’ most frequently selected answer was “I don’t know”, which may
indicate that several participants had gaps in their understanding of the requisite domain.
Secondly, there could be a self-selection bias between the respondents, who
participated in this research study and those who did not.

If there is a systematic

difference between these groups, it could bias the results. Similarly, the between round
dropout rate was high, which could also bias the results between those that completed the
later rounds and those that did not. The high dropout rate may have resulted from the
lengthy and intricate surveys. This maybe an inherent limitation of the survey research
method. Perhaps, a better research approach would have been to use shorter surveys or
maybe even another research method such as focus groups.
Thirdly, the response rate for those working at Big 4 accounting firms was
particularly low, which could have biased the results of Research Question 1. Research
Question 1 tested the relationship between working at a Big 4 accounting firm and the
perceived Business Value of Continuous Monitoring. Perhaps if more Big 4 accountants
had participated in this research, this hypothesis would have been supported.
Finally, this study only evaluated a limited number of scenarios. In all, only three
business cases for three Enterprise Risks were studied. There is a risk that the selected
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business cases were not representative of the underlying Enterprise Risk, which could
have skewed the results. Moreover, there were many Enterprise Risks that were not
included in this research experiment. Perhaps including these Enterprise Risks would
have yielded different results.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Whether or not Continuous Monitoring could be meaningfully extended to Enterprise
Risks still remains an open research question. The obstacles to building such a system
are formidable.

Replacing human judgment tends to be difficult, costly and

computationally intensive. Moreover, large-scale Continuous Monitoring systems may
be resisted because of their inscrutable complexity and novelty. However, many believe
that Continuous Monitoring systems will lead to a more robust and effective
organizational risk management structure.
In the future, Continuous Monitoring could be the cornerstone of risk
management programs. Initially these systems were designed to remove fraud and other
similar pathogens from the organization. Perhaps the absence of fraud and other similar
dysfunctions is not the pinnacle of a healthy organization and just like organisms,
organizations may require more than the absence of pathogens to be completely
“healthy”.
Perhaps, Continuous Monitoring systems could provide a useful check on human
decision-making. Advances in artificial intelligence, big data and Information Systems
may lead to new classes of decision verification systems that will help improve
organization decision-making, which could not only increase profitability, but also reduce
the probability of the next financial crisis. There is still much more research that is
needed in order to make this possibility a reality.
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7.1 Contributions
As a direct result of this research study, a new key relationship was identified between
perceived business value of Continuous Monitoring and the number of years of
experience in Risk Management and Auditing. Participants that had more than five years
of experience in either discipline tended to view Continuous Monitoring more positively
than participants that had less than five years of experience. This relationship was
statistically significant in both Round 1’s exploratory data analysis and the factor analysis
for the Feasibility and Desirability questions, which were Question 15 and Question 16
respectively.
Secondly, this research identifies preferred Enterprise Risks for Continuous
Monitoring systems. Participants were more optimistic about Continuous Monitoring
Systems’ ability to handle computer crime situations than their ability to navigate
strategic issues such as a company losing its competitive position.

Moreover, this

research identified three novel uses for Continuous Monitoring: 1) monitoring social
media to detect potential reputational risks and/or looming public relations crises. 2)
monitoring the speed of operational and production processes. 3) monitoring medical
records for potential early warning signs of a serious medical condition.
Thirdly, this research provides a wealth of qualitative information that could be
used in other studies. For example, the specific risk scenarios gathered by this research
could form the basis of a future Cross Impact Assessment (Bañuls and Turoff 2011).
Finally, this research provides another illustrative example of the Delphi method driving
consensus among research participants.
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7.2 Future Research
This research study provides a general approach for understanding whether Continuous
Monitoring is applicable to an Enterprise Risk. This research study only covered three of
the 14 identified Enterprise Risks. Future research studies can use the same methodology
to study these other Enterprise Risks as well as any new types of Enterprise Risk that
arise. The same methodology could be adapted to study how Continuous Monitoring
could be adapted to a specific industry’s most pressing Enterprise Risks.
Moreover this literature review uncovered many broad categories of research
needed to advance Continuous Monitoring. The list below is the ten most important
questions that I believe should be researched.
1. Workflow: What heuristics could be used to manage and/or prioritize
exceptions identified by a Continuous Monitoring system? How should
Continuous Monitoring workflow be configured? Who should be notified
when an exception is identified and how often?
2. Data: Determine what forms of financial, non-financial, competitive,
marketing and/or qualitative assurance information should be used in a
Continuous Monitoring system. Identify and analyze potential difficulties
associated with the evaluation of data and overcoming data gaps.
3. Data Analysis Algorithms: Can artificial intelligence techniques be used to
improve Continuous Monitoring strategies? How are the monitoring rules
stored and applied to the continuous data stream?
4. Improving Thoroughness and Reliability of decision-making: Empirically
test the relationship between Continuous Monitoring and Organizational
decision making. Does Continuous Monitoring hasten the detection of
errors and decrease the number of bad decisions made by corporations?
5. NPV and Break Even point for a Continuous Monitoring system:
Investigate the extent to which the initial development and deployment
costs of Continuous Monitoring systems can be offset by ongoing savings.
6. Behavioral Effects: Investigate whether managers, analysts and/or markets
will exhibit an adverse or positive reaction to Continuous Monitoring.
How will constituents interact and integrate with Continuous Monitoring
systems?
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7. Architectural Framework: What is the ideal architecture to integrate
control frameworks that link together entities, processes, metrics, analytics
and alarms? Are there systematic differences in the architecture between
Continuous Monitoring implementations? If so what drives them (e.g.,
industry, size, IT characteristics, external auditor, supply partner
integration, or international presence)?
8. Security Issues: Examine the extent to which a Continuous Monitoring
system will create security vulnerabilities. How can the Continuous
Monitoring data be secured? How can data tampering be prevented?
What are the requisite safeguards to ensure the system is not gamed?
9. Success Factors: What are the organizational factors that lead an
organization to adopt Continuous Monitoring technologies?
10. How to audit the decision-maker: For most risks, human judgment is
needed. How can Information Technology audit decisions made by
humans? Many complex business decisions have conflicting criteria and
require tradeoffs between competing objectives. Is it even possible to
automate the monitoring of these decisions? If so, how could the requisite
decision data be captured and analyzed?
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APPENDIX A
ROUND 1 PRE-SURVEY AND SCENARIO GENERATION

This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction to Robert Baksa's Research Study
ABOUT THIS STUDY:
This is a study of business managers’ opinions about the potential usefulness of
Continuous Monitoring to manage Enterprise Risks. Participation in this study typically
takes less than an hour for each of its three rounds. Participants begin by filling in a
formal consent form and providing some background information. In the subsequent, two
rounds a series of targeted questions will be presented. Many individuals find
participation in this study enjoyable, as well as informative. It will give you the
opportunity to engage in sharing opinions and discussions with your peers in other
companies.
ABSTRACT:
A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for timely and
ongoing assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately identified and
mitigated. Enterprises are perpetually exposed to significant errors, fraud and/or
inefficiencies that can lead to significant financial loss and increased levels of operating
risk. Increasingly Information Systems are being harnessed to reinvent the risk
management process. One promising technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to
transform the audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous
review of all transactions. However, today’s highly integrated, rapidly changing and
hypercompetitive business environment spawns numerous risks that have been excluded
from standard risk management and planning processes. An extension of Continuous
Auditing is Continuous Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review
business processes for unexpected deviations. Many believe that Continuous Monitoring
systems will lead to a more robust and effective organizational risk management
processes.
ABOUT ME:
I am a seasoned Information Systems executive with over two decades of technical,
financial, implementation, consulting and risk management expertise, as well as a proven
track record for delivering complex Information Technology systems that produce
tangible financial results. Some of the more notable projects that I've led include
reengineering GM’s financial control systems, developing Citi’s award-winning foreign
exchange trading system, and building Kaplan’s next generation eLearning platform. In
addition, I authored Chapter 12 of Supporting Real Time Decision-Making: The role of
Context in Decision Support on the Move. I have an MBA from the Stern School of
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Business, a Master of Science in Information Systems from New York University, and a
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Business from the University of
Pittsburgh. Currently, I am a Ph.D. candidate in Information Systems at New Jersey
Institute of Technology and employed as a Delivery Practice Head for Lab49, which is a
design and technology-consulting firm that creates advanced technology solutions for the
world’s leading investment banks, asset managers and exchanges
WEBBOARD:
If you would like to interact with your fellow research participants, please go to my
WebBoard http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/ at any point during this research study.
After you complete this survey, go to this web board and click the "Register" link.
However, even without an account, you can browse the posted material and post an
anonymous message to the group.
REFER A FRIEND:
The ideal research participant will be over 21 years of age and have at least five years of
professional experience with operational risk management, Information Systems and/or
auditing. If you know someone that fits this profile and would be potentially willing.
Please contact the researcher.
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last).
2. Please enter your preferred email address.
CONSENT
NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
323 MARTIN LUTHER KING BLVD.
NEWARK, NJ 07102
TITLE OF STUDY:
Continuous Monitoring of Enterprise Risks: a Delphi Feasibility Study.
DURATION:
Maximum estimated duration is 6 months, which assumes two months per round for the
three scheduled rounds.
RESEARCH STUDY:
I have been asked to participate in a research study under the direction of Drs. Murray
Turoff and Starr Roxanne Hiltz.
PROCEDURES:
During the course of this study, I will participate in on-line Delphi surveys and
potentially share my thoughts on a message board.
PARTICIPANTS:
I will be one of no more than 80 participants in this study.
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EXCLUSIONS:
There are two mandatory requirements for this research study: 1) Participants must be
over the age of 21. 2) Participants must have at least five years of professional experience
with risk management, Information Systems and/or auditing. I will inform the researcher
if I do not satisfy the aforementioned requirements.
RISKS/DISCOMFORTS:
I have been told that the study described above involves no obvious risks and/or
discomforts. However, there may be risks and discomforts that are not yet known. I fully
recognize that there may be risks that I may be exposed to by volunteering in this study
which are inherent in participating in any study; I understand that I am not covered by
NJIT’s insurance policy for any injury or loss I might sustain in the course of
participating in the study.
CONFIDENTIALITY:
I understand confidentiality is not the same as anonymous. In this context, confidentiality
means that my name or affiliation will not be disclosed, without expressed permission.
Reasonable safeguards will be put in place to protect participant’s confidentiality. The
raw research data, including the survey responses will be stored on the researcher’s
password-protected and encrypted computer. Moreover, if the findings from the study are
published, participants that don't grant consent will not be identified by name in the list of
participants and their responses, if used, will not be associated with a named individual.
If there is a documented linkage between their identity and responses, reasonable efforts
will be made to maintain their confidentiality unless disclosure is required by law.
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION:
I have been told that I will receive no compensation for my participation in this study.
RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW:
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may refuse to participate, or may
discontinue my participation at any time with no adverse consequence. I also understand
that the investigator has the right to withdraw me from the study at any time.
INDIVIDUAL TO CONTACT:
If you have any questions about the survey's questions, please browse the FAQ thread of
the WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/ or contact the researcher directly:
Robert Baksa
If I have any questions about my treatment or research procedures, I understand that I
should contact the principal investigator at:
Murray Turoff
Roxanne Hiltz
If I have any additional questions about my rights as a research subject, I may contact:
Judith Sheft, IRB Chair, New Jersey Institute of Technology
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CONSENT OF PARTICIPANT
I have read this entire form, and I understand it completely. By "Yes" below, I
acknowledge that I have read this information and agree to participate in this research,
with the knowledge that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without
penalty.
3. I willingly consent to participate in this research study?
Yes
No
4. What is your age?
Less than 21 years old
21-34 years old
35-44 years old
45-54 years old
55-64 years old
65-74 years old
75 years or older
Prefer not to answer
5. How many years of professional experience do you have in the following areas? Enter
0 if you have no experience in a particular area.
Risk Management
Information Systems
Internal and/or External Auditing
6. Can we use your name in a list of participants in the research results? (If no,
“anonymous” will be substituted for your name)?
Yes
No
7. What is your gender?
Female
Male
Prefer NOT to answer
8. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
High School
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
None of the above
9. In what industry do you currently work?
Healthcare
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Manufacturing
Education
Banking/Finance
Insurance
Communications
Transportation
Government
Retail
Hospitality
Other
Not Currently Employed
10. Are you employed by either PWC, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and/or
KPMG?
Yes
No
11. How large is your current employer in terms of Total Annual Revenue?
Under $1M
> $1 Million and <= $10 Million
> $10 Million and <= $100 Million
> $100 Million <= $500 Million
> $500 Million <= $1 Billion
Over $1 Billion
Not sure / Don't know
12. What is your current role in the organization?
C-Level Executive (i.e., CEO, CTO, CIO etc.)
Senior Management (i.e., responsible 50+ people, a geographic region, or
product)
Supervisor / Middle management (i.e., has less than 50 direct reports)
Not Employed
Other
13. To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to
provide material business value to today’s companies?
Very Likely
Likely
Neither Likely or Unlikely
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
Don't Know
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14. In general how feasible would building a Continuous Monitoring system be for this
category of risks
a) Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another
major financial crisis (e.g., Mortgage default)
and/or downturn. Recent examples include
weakness in the Eurozone, projected slowed
economic growth forecast in India and China,
persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated
worldwide unemployment rate, reoccurring
financial crisis, failure of major countries to pay
their debt
b) Regulatory pressure and/or changes in
regulatory environment: Basel III, SOX, DoddFrank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices
legislation, local privacy, investigation by
government agency or regulatory body & laws and
the International Financial Reporting Standards,
Health Care reforms
c) Surprise Competitive Threats: New and, perhaps
better, competitors and/or products in the
marketplace change in consumer trends and
technological advancements (i.e., product
obsolesces), increased global competitive
pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such as
price wars), mergers and acquisitions.
d) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk
e) Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls,
regulatory challenges (e.g., JP Morgan Chase),
involvement in a corporate or personal scandal
(e.g., Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or
product (e.g., Blackberry), unable to meet demand
for successful product, being flamed on social
media.
f) Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits
g) External Business interruption: Infrastructure
failures (e.g., electricity and telecommunication
network failures), financial market failures
(closing of key markets), loss of computer
infrastructure, transportation strikes, criminal
attacks, or embargos.
h) Internal Business interruption: For example
strike or slowdown, accidents, fraud, workplace
violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear power
plant explosion of materials or fires).
i) Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas,
shortages that lead to price run-ups.
j) Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus
and malicious code, proprietary or customer
information can be stolen via hacking or internal
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards); malicious
software can disrupt operations of essential
services such as security, defense, power plants, as
well as banking, commerce, etc.

Very
feasible

Feasible
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Possibly
feasible

Unfeasible

Very
Unfeasible

Don’t
Know

15. How desirable would building a Continuous Monitoring system be for this category
of risks?

a) Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another
major financial crisis (e.g., Mortgage default)
and/or downturn. Recent examples include
weakness in the Eurozone, projected slowed
economic growth forecast in India and China,
persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated
worldwide unemployment rate, reoccurring
financial crisis, failure of major countries to pay
their debt
b) Regulatory pressure and/or changes in
regulatory environment: Basel III, SOX, DoddFrank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices
legislation, local privacy, investigation by
government agency or regulatory body & laws
and the International Financial Reporting
Standards, Health Care reforms
c) Surprise Competitive Threats: New and,
perhaps better, competitors and/or products in
the marketplace change in consumer trends and
technological advancements (i.e., product
obsolesces), increased global competitive
pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such
as price wars), mergers and acquisitions.
d) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk
e) Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls,
regulatory challenges (e.g., JP Morgan Chase),
involvement in a corporate or personal scandal
(e.g., Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or
product (e.g., Blackberry), unable to meet
demand for successful product, being flamed on
social media.
f) Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits

Very
Desirable

Desirable

Neither
Desirable
nor
undesirable

Undesirable

Very
Desirable

Don’t
Know

g) External Business interruption: Infrastructure
failures (e.g., electricity and telecommunication
network failures), financial market failures
(closing of key markets), loss of computer
infrastructure, transportation strikes, criminal
attacks, or embargos.
h) Internal Business interruption: For example
strike or slowdown, accidents, fraud, workplace
violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear
power plant explosion of materials or fires).
i) Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas,
shortages that lead to price run-ups.
j) Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus
and malicious code, proprietary or customer
information can be stolen via hacking or internal
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards);
malicious software can disrupt operations of
essential services such as security, defense,
power plants, as well as banking, commerce, etc.

16. Describe a specific risk scenario that you feel would be the most auspicious area for a
Continuous Monitoring system. Ideally this risk scenario would NOT already be
adequately mitigated by the operating controls currently in place and would be achievable
with existing technology. Please briefly suggest leading indicators, potential
consequences of this risk, and plausible mitigation options. (Optional Question)
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APPENDIX B
ROUND 2: DELPHI

This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Summary of Round 2 Results:
In Round 1, there were 188 fully completed responses, 29 of which were from CLevel
executives (e.g., CEOs, CTOs CIOs, etc.). Respondents had an average of 13 years of I.T.
experience, and six years of risk management and internal/external audit experience. 122
respondents (65% of the total) identified themselves as male and only 11 (6% of the total)
have worked at a Big 4 accounting firm.
The respondents worked in a multitude of different industries. In fact, 60% selected
“Other” for their industry and of the ten industries listed on the survey; each had three or
more respondents. The respondents tended to work in larger companies. “Over a billion”,
which was the largest revenue category on the survey, and was also the most frequently
selected, with 50 respondents (27% of the total). The other 5 revenue levels all had at
least ten respondents each.
Overall, the respondents had a very positive view of Continuous Monitoring. 73
respondents (39% of the total) believed Continuous Monitoring is “Very Likely” to have
material business value, while 83 respondents (44% of the total) believe Continuous
Monitoring is “Likely” to have material business value. In terms of feasibility and
desirability, the top three Enterprise Risks that the participants felt lend themselves to a
Continuous Monitoring system are: (1) Computer Crime (2) Credit, Market and Liquidity
Risk (3) Damage to Brand and Reputation. More respondents (33 or 17.5% of the total)
suggested a specific computer crime scenario (e.g., hacking, IP theft, etc.) as the most
auspicious area for a Continuous Monitoring system. Figure 1 below has the detailed
breakdown of the results.
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last)
2. Please enter your preferred email address?
Directions for Round 2
This round will focus on the top three Enterprise Risks identified in the prior round.
Please read carefully the following excerpts from three Harvard Business School Cases
that describe a specific example of a type of Enterprise Risk and answer the questions
that follow. By design, these cases describe real events that were heavily covered by the
media. So please feel free to pull in additional information that isn’t explicitly stated.
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If you have questions about this round or would like to interact more with your fellow
research participants, please go to my WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/.
Alternatively, you can email your questions directly to me at rbb25@njit.edu
Sony PlayStation: Security Breach
by (Seijts and Bigus 2012) HBS: W12309
Launched by Sony in 2010, Qriocity provided a cloud-based digital video and music
service to consumers. Operated as a subscription service, Qriocity users set up an online
account and paid a fee to access content. For Sony, Qriocity represented an opportunity to
better integrate the company’s consumer electronics with online music, movies and
games. In 2011, Sony had over 350 million Internet-connected devices in use around the
world, providing the company with a significant market of potential Qriocity customers.
Sometime between Sunday, April 17 and Tuesday, April 19, 2011, Sony’s PlayStation
and Qriocity user account information had been compromised as the result of an illegal
intrusion into the company network. In response to this security threat, on Wednesday,
April 20, 2011, Sony suspended all PlayStation and Qriocity networks services for 24
days, while Sony retained an external security firm to conduct a complete investigation of
the incident. On May 4, Sony confirmed that personal information including names,
birthdates, physical and e-mail addresses, network IDs and passwords, and possibly credit
card information was stolen from its 77 million customers, which makes it one of the
largest data security breaches in history. On May 23, Sony stated that this outage cost
$171 million.
Sony had several security incidences before the attack. First, a month before the attack,
the PlayStation.com website was a hacked by a group called Anonymous, apparently in
response to Sony taking legal action against two modders, who are hackers that modify
their consoles to give them additional functionality. Second, PlayStation 3 modders were
claiming that PSN Web servers were running outdated versions of Apache and Linux,
which had well known vulnerabilities. Finally, two weeks before the intrusion, Sony's
networks were probed by a program that checks for known security vulnerabilities. Some
speculate that if Sony had used an intrusion detection system prior to the attack, they may
have noticed these vulnerabilities, which may have prompted them to heighten their
defenses to guard against an attack.
Sony submitted written answers to questions posed by the United States House
Subcommittee about this cyber-attack. Sony stated that they were the victim of a very
carefully planned, professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber-attack. The forensic
teams were able to confirm the scope of the personal data they believed had been taken,
and could not rule out that credit card information was also taken. They were taking a
number of steps to prevent future breaches.
For this type of cyber-attack risk scenario, please answer the following questions:
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3. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of
access).
No Judgment / I don’t know
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form
Some of the relevant data is available digitally
About half of the relevant data is available digitally
Most of the relevant data is available digitally
All the relevant data is available digitally
4. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating
the data into the model.
5. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
6. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made in regards to this question.
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7. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building
this real-time predictive model.
8. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional
consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human
judgments.
9. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion.
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)
Dashboard Reporting
Data Warehouse
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by
a systematic process)
Other (please specify)
Bear Stearns
by (Rose, Bergstresser et al. 2009 )
Founded in 1923, Bear Stearns & Co. (Bear) was the fifth largest U.S. investment bank in
early 2008. However, it burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves
during the week of March 10, 2008. Bear’s economic engine was its fixed income
business. In 2006, Bear’s fixed income business contributed $3.62 billion in revenues,
compared to $1.33 billion from investment banking and $1.38 billion from equities.
Mortgages and mortgage-backed securities comprised most of the fixed income business,
representing about 31% of the securities it owned. Bear was among the largest players in
the mortgage market, and was the leading underwriter of U.S. mortgage backed securities
from 2004 to 2007.
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New financial market stresses, largely rooted in the U.S. housing market, emerged in
2007 and intensified in early 2008. Because home mortgages and home equity loans were
frequently packaged and sold in securities that were in turn sold to a wide variety of
investors, the rapid deterioration of housing prices was widely felt and created a
heightened sense of anxiety across the financial markets. U.S. housing prices had
appreciated rapidly between 1998 and 2006. This occurred alongside easier access to
mortgage finance, especially among less creditworthy borrowers. The origination of
subprime mortgage loans grew from $190 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005.
Even during auspicious periods, mortgage backed securities were often illiquid. As
default rates rose and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated, the absence of a liquid
trading market forced investors to seek bids from the commercial and investment banks
that initially created and sold them. Wary of repurchasing too much of these securities,
banks began to reduce the price they would pay and quantity they would buy for these
securities. This only increased the downward pressure on bond prices, creating a “vicious
circle” among the holders of mortgage backed securities: in addition to the uncertainty in
fundamental value created by rising default rates, the reduction in prices by the bond
dealers created even greater urgency on the part of investors to sell these securities,
which forced the dealers to mark prices down even further. This vicious circle caused
dealers, such as Bear, to accumulate larger and larger inventories of these securities,
which were valued at perpetually lower prices.
Two large hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns had invested heavily in illiquid
Collateralized Debt Obligations tied to mortgage backed securities. These funds had
magnified their exposure to mortgage markets through the use of leverage; the fund
managers were able to purchase as much as $60 worth of Collateralized Debt Obligations
for each dollar invested. When these funds began selling assets to meet investor demands,
it quickly led to the implosion of Bear. Bear survived to the close of business on Friday,
March 14 only because of that morning’s groundbreaking announcement: the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed), using JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC) as a
conduit, would provide Bear with secured financing for a period of up to 28 days. Despite
this unprecedented provision of liquidity support, it was insufficient to reverse the decline
in Bear’s condition. On March 16, Bear’s board accepted JPMC’s offer to purchase Bear
for $2 per share, which was subsequently increased to $10 a share.
For this type of liquidity risk scenario, please answer the following questions:
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10. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of
access).
No Judgment / I don’t know
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form
Some of the relevant data is available digitally
About half of the relevant data is available digitally
Most of the relevant data is available digitally
All the relevant data is available digitally
11. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating
the data into the model.
12. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
13. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made in regards to this question
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14. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building
this real-time predictive model.
15. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or
professional consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human
judgments.
16. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion.
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)
Dashboard Reporting
Data Warehouse
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by
a systematic process)
Other (please specify)
RIM
by (Burr, Rothaermel et al. 2014)
In 1999, RIM introduced the BlackBerry 850 pager, which could receive push email from
a Microsoft Exchange Server. In April 2000, the first BlackBerry smartphone,
BlackBerry 957, was released. It included email, paging and organizer features, as well
as a 32bit Intel 386 processor, 5MB flash memory, a QWERTY keyboard and an
embedded wireless modem.
RIM experienced explosive growth in the early 2000s. Revenues were $85 million in
2000, which by 2007 increased to $3.04 billion and still showed signs of strong growth.
During this period, gross margins had risen from 43% to 54.6%. In addition, RIM had
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cultivated a cult following among customers. The term “CrackBerry” was coined to
characterize Blackberry’s addictive nature. In 2007, RIM had a subscriber base of eight
million.
However, Apple’s January 2007 introduction of the iPhone, which was dubbed the
“Blackberry Killer”, marked the start of RIM’s decline. Competition increased again on
October 22, 2008 when the first commercially available smartphone running Android was
released. In 2009, RIM’s BlackBerry smartphone held a 20% share of the global market.
However, by 2013, RIM’s global market share dropped to 1.9% while smartphones using
Android and Apple respectively held 78.6% and 20% of the global smartphone market. In
the third quarter of 2013, Windows Phones surpassed Blackberry as the third leading
operating system for smartphones.
After 2007, analysts, investors and the media became increasingly concerned about
RIM’s ability to compete. At the time, RIM’s hardware and operating system were
criticized for being outdated and unappealing compared to their competition. Moreover,
the Blackberry’s browsing capabilities were generally considered to be woefully
inadequate compared to its competitors.
In September 2010, RIM announced the long rumored BlackBerry PlayBook tablet,
officially released in April 2011. The PlayBook was criticized for being rushed to market
in an incomplete state and sold poorly. Slow sales led to inventory pileups, which
ultimately resulted in price cuts and a $485 million inventory write down.
In March 2011, RIM indicated that they planned to "launch some powerful new
BlackBerrys." On January 2013, after much criticism and numerous delays, RIM
officially launched two new smartphones, the BlackBerry Z10 and Q10, which thus far
have sold poorly. In 2011, RIM felt that they owned the keyboard phone market and
could afford to wait. However, the early promotion of these supposedly game changing
devices may have hurt sales of BlackBerry’s existing products, which were already
steadily losing market share.
In September 2011, which coincided with the launch of iPhone 4S, the RIM’s Internet
Service suffered a massive outage, impacting millions of customers for several days. On
August 12, 2013, Blackberry announced that it was open to being purchased, which is
one of the reasons that it has been placed on the list of "10 Brands That Will Disappear in
2015."
For the above type of damage to brand risk scenario, please answer the following
questions:
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17. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of
access).
No Judgment / I don’t know
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form
Some of the relevant data is available digitally
About half of the relevant data is available digitally
Most of the relevant data is available digitally
All the relevant data is available digitally
18. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating
the data into the model.
19. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
20. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made in regards to this question
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21. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building
this real-time predictive model.
22. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or
professional consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human
judgments.
23. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion.
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)
Dashboard Reporting
Data Warehouse
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by
a systematic process)
Other (please specify)

139

APPENDIX C
ROUND 3 DELPHI AND POST-SURVEY QUESTIONS

This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Directions for Round 3
Round 3, which is the final round, will focus on confirming or refuting the most popular
assumptions made in Round 2, and give you a chance to revise your answers in light of
these assumptions. The same Harvard Business School Cases will be used as a basis for
Round 3. However, all the questions that didn't collect assumptions have been dropped.
This round concludes with a few questions to assess the perceived quality of this research
study.
If you have questions about this round or would like to interact more with your fellow
research participants, please go to my WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/.
Alternatively, you can email your questions directly to me at rbb25@njit.edu
You will be sent a concise summary of this Round's results within 60 days of the
completion of this round. I will also notify you when my thesis has been completed. In
case you would like to receive a copy.
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last)
2. Please enter your preferred email address?
Summary of Round 2 Results
Round 2 presented three Enterprise Risks: 1) Sony that dealt with cyber security; 2) Bear
Stearns that dealt with operational risk; 3) RIM that dealt with Strategic Risk. The 188
respondents that completed Round 1 were sent the Round 2 survey. Round 2 had 81
respondents that completed the entire survey. The between round dropout rate was 57%.
Roughly half of the participants stated that each component (e.g., analytically
components, dashboard reporting, data warehouses, and digital agents) were required on
all three cases. No new architecture components where identified.
The Likert questions were constructed such that a higher Likert score indicated a more
advantageous scenario for Continuous Monitoring. In aggregate, the results of Round 2
mirrored Round 1. Respondents in Round 2 ranked Sony as the most advantageous
Continuous Monitoring case with a mean Likert score of 3.24 out of 5, which was
followed by Bearn Stearns with a mean Likert score of 3.06 out of 5, while once again
RIM was viewed the least advantageous case with a mean Likert score of 2.95 out of 5.
Interestingly, there was an inverse relationship between a case’s mean advantageous
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score and its standard deviation. Blackberry had the highest aggregate standard deviation
(1.15), followed by Bear Stearns (1.11), and then Sony (1.02). The high standard
deviations represent disagreement between the respondents about the viability of
Continuous Monitoring. The disagreement could result from the vastly different
assumptions respondents made about the cases. Round 3 will explore the veracity of these
assumptions.
Sony PlayStation: Security Breach
by (Seijts and Bigus 2012) HBS: W12309
Launched by Sony in 2010, Qriocity provided a cloud-based digital video and music
service to consumers. Operated as a subscription service, Qriocity users set up an online
account and paid a fee to access content. For Sony, Qriocity represented an opportunity to
better integrate the company’s consumer electronics with online music, movies and
games. In 2011, Sony had over 350 million Internet-connected devices in use around the
world, providing the company with a significant market of potential Qriocity customers.
Sometime between Sunday, April 17 and Tuesday, April 19, 2011, Sony’s PlayStation
and Qriocity user account information had been compromised as the result of an illegal
intrusion into the company network. In response to this security threat, on Wednesday,
April 20, 2011, Sony suspended all PlayStation and Qriocity networks services for 24
days, while Sony retained an external security firm to conduct a complete investigation of
the incident. On May 4, Sony confirmed that personal information including names,
birthdates, physical and e-mail addresses, network IDs and passwords, and possibly credit
card information was stolen from its 77 million customers, which makes it one of the
largest data security breaches in history. On May 23, Sony stated that this outage cost
$171 million.
Sony had several security incidences before the attack. First, a month before the attack,
the PlayStation.com website was a hacked by a group called Anonymous, apparently in
response to Sony taking legal action against two modders, who are hackers that modify
their consoles to give them additional functionality. Second, PlayStation 3 modders were
claiming that PSN Web servers were running outdated versions of Apache and Linux,
which had well known vulnerabilities. Finally, two weeks before the intrusion, Sony's
networks were probed by a program that checks for known security vulnerabilities. Some
speculate that if Sony had used an intrusion detection system prior to the attack, they may
have noticed these vulnerabilities, which may have prompted them to heighten their
defenses to guard against an attack.
Sony submitted written answers to questions posed by the United States House
Subcommittee about this cyber-attack. Sony stated that they were the victim of a very
carefully planned, professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber-attack. The forensic
teams were able to confirm the scope of the personal data they believed had been taken,
and could not rule out that credit card information was also taken. They were taking a
number of steps to prevent future breaches

141

For this type of cyber-attack risk scenario, please answer the following questions:
3. Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the Sony case. Please
state your opinion on their validity

3.1) Standard data access patterns and exceptions to
them can be readily defined and identified
3.2) There exists publicly available data on past
security breaches from other companies as well as
known software and hardware security
vulnerabilities
3.3) All key infrastructure components are running
operating systems and software that can be scanned
using industry standard vulnerability detection
software. This information can be easily accessed,
aggregated and monitored.
3.4) Cyber-attacks can happen very quickly. In
milliseconds, large volumes of highly sensitive data
can be stolen. As such, humans aren't well equipped
to stop an in-flight cyber attack
3.5) The number of possible security threats a large
corporation such as Sony faces is nearly infinite and
new threats appear all the time. As such, it would be
very difficult for even a large team of security
experts to manually review and process all the
requisite information and data.
3.6) Human and automated systems each have their
own complementary strengths. An automated
system is superior at real-time response or for
implementing action as soon as a risk is detected.
However, human judgment is superior at foreseeing
possible threats/risks and initiating a course of
action to mitigate these risks before they materialize.
3.7) The large cost of building this security model
could be spread across a large group of constituents,
which would make the cost "reasonable" for each
individual member.
3.8) Sony's security needs can be adequately met by
3rd party package (e.g., Fireeye) with minimal
customizations.
3.9) The "cost" of relying on human judgment
includes not just the cost to hire the personnel, but
also the costs stem from a security breach
3.10) Very experienced security experts have very
high salaries

I Don't
know /
No
Judgment

Always
True

Generally
True

Generally
False

Always
False

Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please
include its reference (e.g., 3.1, 3.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box blank
if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions
QUESTIONS 4 TO 8 BELOW REFER TO THE SONY CASE:
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please reanswer the below
questions about this case
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4. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
5. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
6. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
7. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional
consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
8. For this case, "Digital Agents" was the most frequently selected component in Round.
Please briefly describe how it could be used in this Continuous Monitoring System
Bear Stearns
by (Rose, Bergstresser et al. 2009 )
Founded in 1923, Bear Stearns & Co. (Bear) was the fifth largest U.S. investment bank in
early 2008. However, it burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves
during the week of March 10, 2008. Bear’s economic engine was its fixed income
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business. In 2006, Bear’s fixed income business contributed $3.62 billion in revenues,
compared to $1.33 billion from investment banking and $1.38 billion from equities.
Mortgages and mortgage-backed securities comprised most of the fixed income business,
representing about 31% of the securities it owned. Bear was among the largest players in
the mortgage market, and was the leading underwriter of U.S. mortgage backed securities
from 2004 to 2007.
New financial market stresses, largely rooted in the U.S. housing market, emerged in
2007 and intensified in early 2008. Because home mortgages and home equity loans were
frequently packaged and sold in securities that were in turn sold to a wide variety of
investors, the rapid deterioration of housing prices was widely felt and created a
heightened sense of anxiety across the financial markets. U.S. housing prices had
appreciated rapidly between 1998 and 2006. This occurred alongside easier access to
mortgage finance, especially among less creditworthy borrowers. The origination of
subprime mortgage loans grew from $190 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005.
Even during auspicious periods, mortgage backed securities were often illiquid. As
default rates rose and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated, the absence of a liquid
trading market forced investors to seek bids from the commercial and investment banks
that initially created and sold them. Wary of repurchasing too much of these securities,
banks began to reduce the price they would pay and quantity they would buy for these
securities. This only increased the downward pressure on bond prices, creating a “vicious
circle” among the holders of mortgage backed securities: in addition to the uncertainty in
fundamental value created by rising default rates, the reduction in prices by the bond
dealers created even greater urgency on the part of investors to sell these securities,
which forced the dealers to mark prices down even further. This vicious circle caused
dealers, such as Bear, to accumulate larger and larger inventories of these securities,
which were valued at perpetually lower prices.
Two large hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns had invested heavily in illiquid
Collateralized Debt Obligations tied to mortgage backed securities. These funds had
magnified their exposure to mortgage markets through the use of leverage; the fund
managers were able to purchase as much as $60 worth of Collateralized Debt Obligations
for each dollar invested. When these funds began selling assets to meet investor demands,
it quickly led to the implosion of Bear. Bear survived to the close of business on Friday,
March 14 only because of that morning’s groundbreaking announcement: the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed), using JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC) as a
conduit, would provide Bear with secured financing for a period of up to 28 days. Despite
this unprecedented provision of liquidity support, it was insufficient to reverse the decline
in Bear’s condition. On March 16, Bear’s board accepted JPMC’s offer to purchase Bear
for $2 per share, which was subsequently increased to $10 a share.
For this type of liquidity risk scenario, please answer the following questions:
Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the Bear Stearns case.
Please state your opinion on their validity
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9.1) Time-series models of held inventory could
provide a directional indication on where the market is
heading.
9.2) In general, modeling would have a difficult time
predicting "black swan" events like this one because by
definition there is very little (if any) historic data on
this risk scenario
9.3) While there is data that can indicate the absence of
liquidity, by the time it is observed, it is likely to be too
late to act on it.
9.4) Experienced traders could predict this black swan
event by generalizing from similar events that occurred
in other markets.
9.5) Markets are largely efficient and unpredictable.
Even if the absence of liquidity could have been
detected by a model, by the time it’s detected it would
likely be too late to do anything about it.
9.6) If a sufficient number of data points could be
aggregated from all market participants, adequate
models could be constructed.
9.7) In these high stake situations, a predictive model
would be more impartial than human judgment, which
could become clouded by greed and self interest
9.8) Illiquid products are difficult to value, and hence,
modeling them would be very difficult and costly.
9.9) Ultimately, like all securities, the price of a MBS
product depends on what the market will pay for it and
that is not predictable in the short term
9.10) These products are only understood by a handful
of highly compensated traders and market participants.
Consequently the costs to build these models would be
very high.

I Don't
know /
No
Judgment

Always
True

Generally
True

Generally
False

Always
False

Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please
include its reference (e.g., 9.1, 9.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box blank
if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions
QUESTIONS 10 TO 14 BELOW REFER TO THE SONY CASE:
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please reanswer the below
questions about this case
10. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
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11. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
12. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
13. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or
professional consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
14. For this case, "Data Warehouse” was the most frequently selected component in
Round. Please briefly describe how it could be used in this Continuous Monitoring
System
RIM
by (Burr, Rothaermel et al. 2014)
In 1999, RIM introduced the BlackBerry 850 pager, which could receive push email from
a Microsoft Exchange Server. In April 2000, the first BlackBerry smartphone,
BlackBerry 957, was released. It included email, paging and organizer features, as well
as a 32bit Intel 386 processor, 5MB flash memory, a QWERTY keyboard and an
embedded wireless modem.
RIM experienced explosive growth in the early 2000s. Revenues were $85 million in
2000, which by 2007 increased to $3.04 billion and still showed signs of strong growth.
During this period, gross margins had risen from 43% to 54.6%. In addition, RIM had
cultivated a cult following among customers. The term “CrackBerry” was coined to
characterize Blackberry’s addictive nature. In 2007, RIM had a subscriber base of eight
million.
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However, Apple’s January 2007 introduction of the iPhone, which was dubbed the
“Blackberry Killer”, marked the start of RIM’s decline. Competition increased again on
October 22, 2008 when the first commercially available smartphone running Android was
released. In 2009, RIM’s BlackBerry smartphone held a 20% share of the global market.
However, by 2013, RIM’s global market share dropped to 1.9% while smartphones using
Android and Apple respectively held 78.6% and 20% of the global smartphone market. In
the third quarter of 2013, Windows Phones surpassed Blackberry as the third leading
operating system for smartphones.
After 2007, analysts, investors and the media became increasingly concerned about
RIM’s ability to compete. At the time, RIM’s hardware and operating system were
criticized for being outdated and unappealing compared to their competition. Moreover,
the Blackberry’s browsing capabilities were generally considered to be woefully
inadequate compared to its competitors.
In September 2010, RIM announced the long rumored BlackBerry PlayBook tablet,
officially released in April 2011. The PlayBook was criticized for being rushed to market
in an incomplete state and sold poorly. Slow sales led to inventory pileups, which
ultimately resulted in price cuts and a $485 million inventory write down.
In March 2011, RIM indicated that they planned to "launch some powerful new
BlackBerrys." On January 2013, after much criticism and numerous delays, RIM
officially launched two new smartphones, the BlackBerry Z10 and Q10, which thus far
have sold poorly. In 2011, RIM felt that they owned the keyboard phone market and
could afford to wait. However, the early promotion of these supposedly game changing
devices may have hurt sales of BlackBerry’s existing products, which were already
steadily losing market share.
In September 2011, which coincided with the launch of iPhone 4S, the RIM’s Internet
Service suffered a massive outage, impacting millions of customers for several days. On
August 12, 2013, Blackberry announced that it was open to being purchased, which is
one of the reasons that it has been placed on the list of "10 Brands That Will Disappear in
2015."
For the above type of damage to brand risk scenario, please answer the following
questions:

147

15. Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the RIM case. Please
state your opinion on their validity

15.1) Innovation is still strictly a human endeavor,
modeling it would be a limited value
15.2) Basic market research, customer polls, and
declining sales trend could have provided a strong
leading indicator to the downfall RIM's dominance.
15.3) Detecting RIM's declining sales could be done
adequately well by either a human or a predictive
algorithm. However, only a human could formulate and
implement a strategic vision to reverse this trend
15.4) A predictive model could pull information from
the web by scanning Facebook postings, twitter feeds,
etc. to predict RIM's looming decline
15.5) This predictive model doesn't need to be real time.
It could safely be run monthly quarterly, or even yearly
15.6) Experts have a very tough time predicting which
products will be "hot" and which products will fall out
of favor
15.7) Highly creative people are expensive
15.8) In RIM's situation, human judgment was blinded
by over confidence
15.9) The market forces that led to RIM's decline were
so unique that building a predictive model for them
would be prohibitively expensive and, probably not
very reusable
15.10) Apple and Android's ultimate success in the
market place couldn't be predicted by any means

I Don't
know /
No
Judgment

Always
True

Generally
True

Generally
False

Always
False

Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please
include its reference (e.g., 15.1, 15.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box
blank if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions
QUESTIONS 16 TO 20 BELOW REFER TO THE RIM CASE:
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please reanswer the below
questions about this case
16. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group?
No Judgment / I don’t know
Definitely Infeasible
Possibly Infeasible
Feasible
Possibly Feasible
Definitely Feasible
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17. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be
No Judgment / I don’t know
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
About the same
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions
18. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Extremely cheap
Relatively cheap
Reasonable
Moderately expensive
Prohibitively expensive
19. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or
professional consultants) for this risk would be:
No Judgment / I don’t know
Prohibitively expensive
Moderately expensive
Reasonable
Relatively cheap
Extremely cheap
20. For this case, "Analytical Functions" was the most frequently selected component in
Round 2. Please briefly describe how they could be used in this Continuous Monitoring
System.
Post Survey Questions
21. Did you obtain useful information from this study?
None
Not much
A few pieces of useful information
Some useful information
Lots of useful information
22. What is the potential importance of this study's results?
Irrelevant
Not very important
Somewhat important
Important
Very Important
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23. To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to
provide material business value to today’s companies?
Very Likely
Likely
Neither Likely or Unlikely
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
24. What was the overall quality of this study?
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very high
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